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  INTRODUCTION   
A single woman uses an anonymous sperm donor to have a 
child. She spends hours poring over his file at the sperm bank, 
learning intimate details like his favorite color and his grand-
mother’s medical history. She becomes pregnant with this do-
nor and gives birth to a baby boy; the donor is not the boy’s fa-
ther. By contrast, a different single woman has a one-night 
stand with a man whom she met only hours before; she barely 
remembers his eye color, let alone his name. She, too, becomes 
pregnant with this man and gives birth to a baby girl; the man 
is the girl’s father. 
A married couple uses a fertility specialist to facilitate con-
ception through alternative insemination. The husband, a 
chronic liar and adulterer, provides the specialist with a vial of 
semen; the specialist inseminates the wife without first testing 
the semen for communicable diseases like HIV. By contrast, a 
single woman contacts a man who decides to advertise over the 
Internet free alternative insemination services; they become 
very close friends, sharing life histories and intimate personal 
information. They pursue alternative insemination, but are 
dismayed to discover that the government requires donations 
between certain partners who are not “sexually intimate” to be 
tested for communicable diseases like HIV.1 The testing is cost-
 
 1. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.90(a)(2) (2012) (exempting from the Food and 
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ly, so the man discontinues his services and the woman instead 
contacts a sperm bank, buying semen that carries a hefty price 
tag—$800.00 a vial—in large part because of the government’s 
mandatory testing requirements for procreative partners who 
are not “sexually intimate.” 
A same-sex couple falls in love with an anonymous donor 
from a sperm bank; the couple intends to purchase vials of his 
semen within the year. To the couple’s disappointment, the 
government passes a law banning anonymous sperm donation 
in order to protect children’s right to know their genetic progen-
itors. The donor, who desires anonymity, retires from the 
bank’s donor program, forcing the couple to choose a less desir-
able open donor. By contrast, a single woman has a child after 
a one-night stand. When the child is eight years old she asks 
her mother about her “father”; the woman tells her daughter 
that she lacks any identifying information, including a name, 
about him. 
Some of these vignettes, like the first two, reflect laws that 
apply today in most jurisdictions. Others, like the third, are 
emblematic of proposed regulations of alternative reproduction 
that several commentators, conservative and progressive alike, 
support.2 All of them reflect and perpetuate this Article’s sub-
ject of critique: reproductive binarism, the belief that sexual 
and alternative reproduction are essentially different in fact 
and therefore deserve different treatment in law. 
Reproductive binarism governs large swathes of intimate 
and family life, from paternity determinations3 to the federal 
regulation of gamete providers4 to the myriad proposed regula-
tions of alternative reproduction that have surfaced in recent 
years.5 Reproductive binarism sustained marriage discrimina-
 
Drug Administration’s mandatory testing requirements for human reproduc-
tive cells or tissue semen donations between “sexually intimate partner[s]” but 
requiring testing for donations between non-intimate partners). 
 2. Progressive scholars have relied on reproductive binarism to justify 
limits on alternative reproduction, see infra Part I.C., as have former oppo-
nents of same-sex marriage. See Courtney Megan Cahill, The Oedipus Hex: 
Regulating Family After Marriage Equality, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 228 
(2015) [hereinafter Cahill, Oedipus Hex]. 
 3. See infra Part I.A. 
 4. See infra Part I.B. 
 5. For these proposed regulations of alternative reproduction, see infra 
Part I.C. Many of these proposals and their potentially burdensome effects on 
non-traditional procreators are also examined in Courtney Megan Cahill, 
Obergefell and the “New” Reproduction, MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES (2016); Ca-
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tion against same-sex couples for nearly fifty years, until the 
Supreme Court finally rejected it as unconstitutional in 
Obergefell v. Hodges.6 It touches everyone and disciplines 
many: men, whether gay or straight; women, whether straight 
or lesbian; heterosexual couples; same-sex couples; sperm do-
nors, both anonymous and known; transgender and cisgender 
individuals; sexuals and asexuals.7 Reproductive binarism con-
flicts with existing and emerging constitutional values like pro-
creative intentionality and familial autonomy and is predicated 
on a cramped vision of sex and intimacy. Moreover, it is stub-
born, persisting in many domains even as it is jettisoned in 
others, and enjoys nearly universal support, uniting critics of 
non-traditional families with those families’ allies. Conception 
“the old-fashioned way, through sexual intercourse” is just dif-
ferent from alternative reproduction, a traditionalist commen-
tator argues.8 Sex and alternative insemination “are, in fact, 
different, and different enough to satisfy any level of constitu-
tional scrutiny,”9 echoes a progressive family law scholar. 
This Article challenges reproductive binarism on factual 
and constitutional grounds and considers how the law might—
and why it should—operationalize a unitary system of repro-
ductive regulation based on procreative intent rather than pro-
creative mechanics. The product of the very law that rendered 
alternative reproduction licit,10 the law’s sex/non-sex distinction 
is factually questionable because it obscures the basic similari-
ties that exist among all forms of procreation. But as this Arti-
cle argues, the law’s reproductive binary is also constitutionally 
 
hill, Oedipus Hex, supra note 2, at 192–99; Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equal-
ity and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1195–1230 (2016). 
 6. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (rejecting the procreation rationale for mar-
riage prohibitions). The sex/non-sex binary’s role in sustaining marriage dis-
crimination against same-sex couples will be discussed at greater length be-
low. See infra Part III.A.2, Part IV. 
 7. For a rich discussion of the pervasive, and often privileged, status of 
sex in American legal culture and the burdens that “compulsory sexuality” 
places on asexuals, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 303 (2014). 
 8. Elizabeth Marquardt, One Parent or Five: A Global Look at Today’s 
New Intentional Families, COMM’N ON PARENTHOOD’S FUTURE: INST. FOR AM. 
VALUES 1, 23 (2011), http://americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/one_parent_or_ 
five.pdf. 
 9. Naomi Cahn, Do Tell! The Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring, 42 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1077, 1106 (2014) [hereinafter Cahn, Do Tell!]. 
 10. Part II argues at greater length that the legalization of alternative 
insemination in the 1970s is partly responsible for the law’s sex/non-sex bina-
ry. See infra Part II.C. 
  
2016] REPRODUCTION RECONCEIVED 621 
 
deficient, particularly in light of constitutional norms relating 
to intimate and family life. 
The law’s sex/non-sex binary is a product of the belief that 
the Constitution protects—if it protects any form at all—sexual 
but not alternative procreation.11 That assumption, in turn, is a 
product of sex exceptionalism and “intimacy essentialism.”12 
The law generally treats sex as unique, different not just in de-
gree but also in kind from other species of conduct, and the law 
of reproduction is no different.13 Moreover, the law essentializes 
intimacy by assuming that it is—and ought to be—non-
commercial, private, and dyadic rather than commercial, pub-
lic, and polyadic. Reproductive binarism reflects and replicates 
those same assumptions.14 
Reproductive binarism is also a product of history. Before 
alternative insemination became legally recognized in the 
United States in the 1960s and 1970s,15 courts, commentators, 
doctors, and patients conceptualized it in sexual terms. Either 
 
 11. See infra notes 133–37 and accompanying text. 
 12. This Article borrows these terms from Adrienne Davis, who explains 
opposition to polygamy, in part, on “intimacy essentialism.” Adrienne D. Da-
vis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equali-
ty, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2033 (2010). 
 13. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 14. For a discussion of how intimacy essentialism—specifically, the belief 
that intimacy and commerce are distinctive domains—shapes contemporary 
legal norms surrounding alternative procreation, see Martha M. Ertman, Un-
expected Links Between Baby Markets and Intergenerational Justice, 8 L. & 
ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 271, 274–79 (2014) [hereinafter Ertman, Unexpected 
Links]; Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?: A New 
and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?]. 
 15. Before the 1960s, alternative insemination by donor was treated just 
like sex: the donor was a legal father (even if he contracted out of legal 
parenthood ex ante), the woman, if married, was treated as an adulterer, and 
the child as illegitimate. See, e.g., Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Ill. 
Super. Ct. 1954) (holding that a married woman inseminated with donor se-
men had committed adultery and that the child conceived with that donor was 
illegitimate), appeal dismissed, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956). Starting in the 1960s 
and continuing into the 1970s, states started to legally recognize alternative 
insemination by donor by treating the husband, not the donor, as the legal fa-
ther of any child that resulted from alternative insemination. See, e.g., People 
v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495 (1968). In 1973, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws codified the trend in the states toward legal 
recognition of alternative insemination by donor by adopting a Uniform Par-
entage Act that “expressly approved donor artificial insemination (at least by 
married couples), designating the husband as the (only) father.” HENRY T. 
GREELY, THE END OF SEX AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 47 
(2016). 
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they called it “adultery by doctor”16 and deemed the resulting 
children “illegitimate,”17 or they followed certain protocols 
whose aim it was to sexualize the procedure.18 Eventually, how-
ever, legislators and regulators legitimized alternative insemi-
nation by de-sexualizing it and by drawing a clear distinction 
between sexual life creation and commercial/medical life crea-
tion. Reproductive binarism could very well be the living arti-
fact of that legal and cultural shift.19 
Simply because the law’s sex/non-sex binary can be ex-
plained, however, does not mean that it is beyond critique. Re-
productive binarism is factually inaccurate, obscuring the basic 
similarities that exist between sexual and alternative reproduc-
tion. Sexual and alternative reproduction are categories that 
overlap with each other—in some cases perfectly so. Reproduc-
tion the “old-fashioned way” can be non-intimate, planned, and 
assisted in ways ordinarily associated with “assisted” reproduc-
tion, and “assisted” reproduction can be intimate and unpre-
dictable in ways typically associated with sexual reproduction. 
In some instances, sexual and alternative reproduction are the 
same thing.20 
Consider the first vignette above. Scholars who hew to a 
sex/non-sex distinction assume that sexual and alternative re-
production warrant different legal treatment in part because 
one is intimate and the other less so. But that all depends on 
what one means by “intimate,” as there is greater “closeness” in 
some ways between the non-sexual procreators in that story 
than there is between those of the sexual variety. This Article 
argues that the factors on which scholars rely to justify a dual 
system of reproductive regulation—intimacy, familiarity, sex, 
deliberation, control, predictability, and naturalness—are ulti-
mately insufficient to sustain that system, not only because 
they are vague and imprecise, but also because they could just 
as easily describe one form of procreation as another. 
Even if sexual and alternative reproduction were formally 
distinct, the law’s sex/non-sex binary would still raise concern 
as a matter of constitutional law. Neither the text of the Con-
 
 16. Kara W. Swanson, Adultery by Doctor: Artificial Insemination, 1890-
1945, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 591, 593 (2012). 
 17. Id. at 621. 
 18. Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A 
Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1050 (2002). 
 19. See infra Part II.C. 
 20. See infra Part III.B. 
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stitution, nor constitutional history nor doctrine, supports dif-
ferent legal treatment of sexual and alternative reproduction, 
particularly different treatment that is predicated on sex 
exceptionalism and intimacy essentialism. To the contrary, 
constitutional norms relating to sex, marriage, procreation, and 
family formation favor—indeed, mandate—similar treatment of 
procreation regardless of the form that it assumes.21 
Recent gay rights jurisprudence is notable in this regard, 
including marriage equality jurisprudence. That jurisprudence 
decenters the privileged status that heterosexual intercourse 
has long enjoyed in the law and champions the intentional 
parenthood that alternative reproduction often makes possi-
ble.22 This Article draws from that jurisprudence to highlight 
the normative and constitutional deficiencies of regulating the 
practice of alternative reproduction in ways that undercut pro-
creative intent and that discipline individuals’ attempts to “es-
tablish” a family.23 More radical still, this Article uses that ju-
risprudence to force the question of whether the law can ever 
treat procreation differently depending on the acts that facili-
tate it. It not only asks how marriage equality might constrain 
emerging proposals to regulate the practice of alternative re-
production, but also confronts an even bigger issue: whether 
the sex/non-sex binary that disciplines kinship creation for eve-
ryone is sustainable. 
Parts I and II of this Article are descriptive in scope. Part I 
examines the law’s reproductive binary as it exists in judicial 
decisions, state and federal legislation, and academic commen-
tary, while Part II offers conceptual and historical reasons for 
it. Parts III and IV, which move from the descriptive to the ar-
gumentative, critique the law’s sex/non-sex distinction on fac-
tual and constitutional grounds. Part III demonstrates that 
sexual and alternative reproduction are overlapping categories 
with common attributes; in so doing, this Part destabilizes the 
position that sexual and alternative reproduction occupy the 
extreme ends of a single reproductive continuum, and illus-
trates that in some cases, sexual and alternative reproduction 
are, in fact, the same thing. Part IV contends that reproductive 
 
 21. See infra Part IV. 
 22. See infra Part IV.D. 
 23. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that 
“the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right to marry, estab-
lish a family, raise children, and enjoy the full protection of a state’s marital 
laws”). 
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binarism, unsupported by either constitutional text or history, 
is in tension with existing and emerging constitutional norms 
relating to sex, marriage, procreation, and family formation. 
Part V reflects on what the law might look like in the absence 
of the sex/non-sex binary; it offers a unitary model of reproduc-
tive regulation grounded in intent (rather than form) and antic-
ipates (and responds to) possible objections to that model.  
I.  REPRODUCTIVE BINARISM AND THE LAW   
From paternity determinations to the federal regulation of 
sperm banks to proposed regulations of alternative reproduc-
tion, the overwhelming trend in the law is to treat sexual pro-
creation differently than its alternative counterpart—often on 
the assumption that intimacy exists in the first context but not 
in the latter. Sections A–C consider each of those bodies of law. 
Some important exceptions to this general trend of differential 
treatment exist, however, and Section D briefly considers them. 
A. STATE REGULATION OF PATERNITY 
A sex/non-sex binary drives paternity determinations in 
American jurisdictions where the question has been ad-
dressed.24 States vary significantly with respect to who consti-
tutes a donor or a father when individuals or couples use either 
known or anonymous donors to conceive children through al-
ternative reproductive means.25 States vary not at all, however, 
with respect to the legal status of donors who help unmarried 
women to conceive through a sexual act: in all states, that do-
nor is a father, regardless of the intentions of the parties and 
 
 24. See Lauren Gill, Who’s Your Daddy?: Defining Paternity Rights in the 
Context of Free, Private Sperm Donation, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1715, 1738 
n.153 (2013) (listing these jurisdictions). 
 25. Some states still follow the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) of 1973, 
which provides that donors are not legal fathers if they provide semen to a 
physician for inseminating a married woman who is not the donor’s wife. See 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973); Gill, supra note 24, at 1738 & n.151. Oth-
er states follow the revised Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 (amended in 2002), 
which provides that no donor will be considered a parent of any child that re-
sults from his donation, regardless of the marital status of the recipient and 
regardless of whether the insemination involved a physician. See UNIF. PAR-
ENTAGE ACT § 702 (2000) (amended 2002); Gill, supra note 24, at 1738 & 
n.152. Comments to the amended UPA clarify that the married woman re-
quirement “is not realistic in light of present ART practices and the constitu-
tional protections of the procreative rights of unmarried as well as married 
women.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. (2000) (amended 2002). 
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regardless of whether or not a written non-paternity contract 
existed between them.26 
Subsection 1 examines the reproductive binary that drives 
state paternity determinations of sexual inseminators. Subsec-
tion 2 examines the reproductive binary that drives state pa-
ternity determinations of alternative inseminators. Subsection 
2 demonstrates that reproductive binarism has influenced even 
the regulatory approach to alternative insemination, with more 
intimate donations tending to result in fatherhood and less in-
timate donations tending to avoid that legal status.27 
1. Sexual Insemination 
No court has ever recognized a waiver of paternity where 
an unmarried woman intentionally conceives a child with a 
man through sexual intercourse.28 For instance, in Straub v. 
B.M.T., the Indiana Supreme Court refused to uphold a written 
pre-conception contract between a man and a woman who 
agreed to conceive a child through sexual intercourse rather 
than through alternative insemination.29 In addition to reject-
ing the legal possibility of “artificial insemination by inter-
 
 26. See generally Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology?: The History 
and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 22–23 (2004) [hereinafter Baker, Bargaining]; Katharine K. Baker, 
Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 701 
(2008) [hereinafter Baker, Bionormativity] (stating that American law has 
“never allowed men and women to agree to waive parental status before or af-
ter the intercourse that led to conception”). The revised UPA makes clear that 
the term “donor” applies only to assisted reproduction and therefore does not 
include someone who helps to create a child through sexual intercourse. See 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701 (2000) (“This [article] does not apply to the birth 
of a child conceived by means of sexual intercourse”). 
 27. It is important to highlight at the outset that more intimate donations 
(including sexual donations) tend to result in fatherhood if the recipient fe-
male is unmarried. If she is married to a man other than the donor, then the 
marital presumption of parenthood may trump the law’s tendency to impose 
fatherhood in sexual/intimate donation settings. For cases where the marital 
presumption trumped the sexual conception paternity rule, see Michael H. v. 
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion); K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 
798 (Pa. 2012). 
 28. Of course, the fact that no court has ever found non-paternity in a sit-
uation involving sexual conception between a man and an unmarried woman 
does not mean that such sexual insemination cases do not exist. Donor insem-
ination by intercourse has been discussed in the media. See infra note 259. In 
addition, Quebec, unlike the United States, recognizes sexual sperm donation, 
but gives the sperm donor one year from the birth of any child to change his 
mind and assert legal paternity. See infra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 29. 645 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. 1994). 
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course,”30 the court reasoned that pre-conception contracts 
predicated on sex violated public policy because “sexual inter-
course as consideration is itself against public policy.”31 In addi-
tion, the Straub court found that the agreement at issue in that 
case failed to adhere to the requisite formalities that sometimes 
apply in the alternative insemination context,32 including the 
“physician involvement” requirement that obtains in some 
states33 as well as under the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act.34 
Similarly, in Kesler v. Weniger,35 a trial court in Pennsyl-
vania refused to uphold an alleged oral agreement between a 
woman and a man, the latter of whom agreed to inseminate the 
former sexually on condition that he would not have any legal 
obligations with respect to any child or children that might re-
sult. Like the Straub court, the Weniger court “decline[d] to 
recognize a category of ‘artificial insemination by inter-
course,’”36 reasoning that child support “cannot be bargained 
away before conception any more than it can be bargained 
away after birth.”37 
Other courts have similarly drawn an explicit sex/non-sex 
distinction when discussing when a donor becomes a father, 
reasoning that where “conception [takes] place by intercourse, 
there [is] no question that the ‘donor’ [is] the father.”38 For the-
se courts, the notion that sexual intercourse results in paterni-
ty is so obvious as to defy explanation. As the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania recently remarked, the “distinction between re-
production via sexual intercourse and the non-sexual clinical 
options for conception”39—two “extremes of an increasingly 
complicated continuum,” in the court’s words40—is a matter of 
 
 30. Id. at 601. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 601 n.10. 
 34. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973). 
 35. 744 A.2d 794 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). 
 36. Id. at 796. 
 37. Id. 
 38. C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 824 (N.J. Super. 1977); see also Estes v. 
Albers, 504 N.W.2d 607, 609 (S.D. 1993) (rejecting the argument that a man 
was a sperm donor to a woman with whom he conceived a biological child 
“naturally” rather than “artificially”). 
 39. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1245 (Pa. 2007) (upholding 
oral agreement between mother and donor that relinquished the latter’s rights 
and responsibilities over any children that resulted from in vitro fertilization 
with the donor’s sperm). 
 40. Id. at 1246. 
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simple “commonsense.”41 This distinction was on clear display 
in In re Paternity of M.F.,42 a 2010 Indiana paternity case which 
held that a man could be the legal father of a child whom he 
sexually conceived with the biological mother but not of a dif-
ferent child whom he alternatively conceived with that same 
person.43 
The law’s treatment of the status of men who sexually con-
ceive with unmarried women by design tracks its treatment of 
the status of men who sexually conceive with unmarried wom-
en by accident: the latter cohort, as the law in every state 
makes clear, cannot avoid the obligations of fatherhood, even if 
the legal mother agrees to a waiver of paternity.44 In addition, 
the law’s treatment of “insemination by intercourse” tracks its 
treatment of men who become fathers as the result of an under-
lying sexual act to which they never consented, as when a 
pregnancy results from statutory rape of a male by a female45 or 
from non-consensual sex between two adults.46 It also tracks 
the law’s treatment of men whose sperm is “misappropriated” 
by women and used by them to self-inseminate (without the 
 
 41. Id. at 1245. 
 42. In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
 43. The In re Paternity of M.F. court found non-paternity with respect to 
the child whom the man conceived through alternative insemination for three 
reasons. First, the man and the woman, despite a prior sexual relationship (or 
at least encounter) that led to the conception and birth of the woman’s other 
child, had conceived the second child through alternative, not sexual, means. 
Id. at 1260. Second, the man and the woman had a Donor Agreement, pre-
pared by an attorney, that “reflect[ed] the parties’ careful consideration of the 
implications of such an agreement and a thorough understanding of its mean-
ing and import.” Id. at 1261. Third, the man and the woman used a physician 
in the alternative insemination process. See id. at 1260. 
 44. See Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 26 at 701 (stating that Ameri-
can law has “never allowed men and women to agree to waive parental status 
before or after the intercourse that led to conception”). 
 45. See, e.g., L.M.E. v. A.R.S., 680 N.W.2d 902 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); Cty 
of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 50 Cal. App. 4th 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); 
Kansas ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993); Mercer Cty. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Imogene T. v. Alf M., 589 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. 
Fam. Ct. 1992). 
 46. See, e.g., State v. Daniel G.H. (In re Paternity of Derek S.H.), No. 01-
0473, 2002 WL 265006 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2002) (imposing paternity on a 
man even though he was the alleged victim of non-consensual sexual inter-
course); S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) 
(imposing paternity on a man whose fatherhood resulted from an act of sexual 
intercourse in which he allegedly engaged while unconscious on the ground 
“[t]he child is an innocent party, and . . . any wrongful conduct on the part of 
the mother should not alter the father’s duty to provide support for the child”). 
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men’s consent) following an act of consensual oral sex or who 
were misled about the woman’s use of contraception or ability 
to conceive.47 Conception between men and unmarried women 
that is the product of some sexual act, it turns out, whether 
consensual or not and whether by design or not, results in pa-
ternity. As one court put it, “some sort of sexual contact” be-
tween unmarried women and unwilling men that results in 
conception is enough to justify the imposition of paternity on 
those men.48 
At first blush, it appears that courts’ refusal to recognize 
paternity waivers in sexual insemination cases between un-
married women and men originates in a desire to steer those 
individuals into units that resemble the traditional, nuclear 
family (mother, father, and children) and to guarantee that 
children have two parents to financially support them.49 But if 
re-creating the traditional family were the law’s paramount 
concern, then why do most states recognize non-paternity in a 
 
 47. See Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Feb. 22, 2005) (rejecting a man’s claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and 
conversion against a woman with whom he had consensual oral sex and who 
allegedly used his semen without his consent to be inseminated); Wallis v. 
Smith, 22 P.3d 682 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting a man’s claims of fraud, 
breach of contract, conversion, and prima facie tort against a woman who 
falsely claimed she was using contraception and became pregnant); State v. 
Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032, 1035–36 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (imposing paternity on a 
man whose semen was allegedly used without his consent to inseminate a 
woman with whom he had consensual oral sex); Moorman v. Walker, 773 P.2d 
887, 888–89 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting a man’s misrepresentation claim 
against a woman who allegedly claimed she was infertile and became preg-
nant); In re L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 713–15 (N.Y. 1983) (im-
posing paternity on a man notwithstanding the lower court’s finding that the 
mother intentionally deceived the father as to her use of contraception). 
 48. Frisard, 694 So. 2d at 1036. 
 49. In Straub, for instance, the court analogized the sexual insemination 
contract at issue there, where a man attempted to contract out of paternity 
before having sex, to situations where fathers have attempted to contract out 
of child support obligations after a child has come into being. Straub v. B.M.T., 
645 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind. 1994). As the court remarked: “Neither parent has 
the right to contract away . . . support benefits. The right to the support lies 
exclusively with the child.” Id. Similarly, in Weniger the court dismissed the 
sexual donor’s contention that his “role” was “merely that of a man obliging a 
friend with donations of sperm,” declaring that “the right to support is a right 
of the child, not the mother or father. It cannot be bargained away before con-
ception any more than it can be bargained away after birth.” Kesler v. 
Weniger, 744 A.2d 794, 796 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). On the surface, then, the 
courts in both of these cases appeared more concerned with channeling indi-
viduals into traditional—and financially stable—family units than with the 
procreative mechanics that were at issue in each of them. 
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large number of non-sexual donation cases involving men and 
single women? “[I]mmunity from child support obligations is 
never available in cases of sexual conception,” Susan Frelich 
Appleton writes, but often available in cases of alternative con-
ception.50 
In addition, ensuring that children are financially support-
ed by two parents is not always the principal driver of paternity 
rules. Consider in this regard cases where courts have permit-
ted men to disestablish paternity when their wives become 
pregnant through sexual conception with another man but not 
when those wives become pregnant through non-sexual concep-
tion with anonymous sperm—even when those husbands have 
been raising children for years and where financial support 
from a “new” father is uncertain. In one such case, a court sug-
gested that if a married woman effectively cheats on her hus-
band with a syringe—by being artificially inseminated without 
his consent—then he will still be the father of the child if he 
consents ex post.51 
If, however, a married woman cheats on her husband 
through coitus, then her husband will never be the father of a 
child that results, even if he consents ex post by assuming the 
duties of fatherhood and even if financial support is not forth-
coming from the child’s “natural” father.52 
That case and at least one other like it53 suggest that the 
mode of conception, beyond a desire to protect the financial in-
 
 50. Susan Frelich Appleton, Between the Binaries: Exploring the Legal 
Boundaries of Nonanonymous Sperm Donation, 49 FAM. L.Q. 93, 108–09 
(2015). 
 51. See Dews v. Dews, 632 A.2d 1160, 1169 (D.C. 1993) (reasoning that 
“[t]he manner of conception is significant for estoppel purposes”). The father in 
Dews had assumed the responsibilities of parenthood over the child in ques-
tion for ten years before attempting to disclaim paternity and thereby avoid a 
child support obligation. Id. at 1164–66. Moreover, the husband knew the en-
tire time that his son was not biologically related to him. Id. Nevertheless, the 
court concluded, the doctrine of estoppel could not be raised by the husband’s 
wife in order to defeat his non-paternity claim because of the manner in which 
conception occurred: coitally rather than artificially. Id. at 1168. 
 52. As the court stated in a footnote: “We emphasize . . . that the availa-
bility or unavailability of other resources [for the child] cannot affect the rights 
of Mr. Dews or of other husbands in his situation.” Id. at 1169 n.12. 
 53. The Dews court’s logic has been echoed by other courts in analogous 
contexts. See In re Marriage of Adams, 701 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (Ill. App. 1998) 
(reasoning that courts ought to distinguish between “artificial insemination 
and insemination by another man” when determining whether a man ought to 
be estopped from denying paternity and rejecting a mother’s estoppel claim 
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terests of children, is driving determinations of fatherhood in at 
least some contested paternity cases, regardless of the marital 
status of the mother. Recall also In re Paternity of M.F.,54 the 
Indiana Court of Appeals paternity case discussed above. 
There, a sexually conceived child was protected through child 
support from the legal father whereas a child alternatively con-
ceived with the sperm of that same man (and living in the same 
household as the other child) was not.55 
Like these decisions, the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) 
draws a clear distinction between sexual and non-sexual dona-
tions. The UPA was originally passed in 1973 by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Confer-
ence) to provide a uniform parentage law for children born to 
married and unmarried persons; the Conference has amended 
the UPA twice since that time. Article 1 of the current UPA de-
fines “donor” as someone who “produces eggs or sperm used for 
assisted reproduction”56 and defines “assisted reproduction” as 
“a method of causing pregnancy other than sexual inter-
course.”57 In addition, Article 7 of the Act, which deals with 
children of “assisted reproduction,” provides that “[t]his [arti-
cle] does not apply to the birth of a child conceived by means of 
sexual intercourse.”58 The Comment section for Article 7 ex-
plains that “a child conceived by sexual intercourse is not cov-
ered by this article, irrespective of the alleged intent of the par-
ties.”59 As with decisional law, a dividing line between paternity 
and non-paternity for the UPA is sex. 
2. Alternative Insemination 
Not unlike the role that it plays in the legal regulation of 
sexual insemination, reproductive binarism also informs, at 
least historically and to some extent today, the question of pa-
ternity in the alternative insemination context. To be sure, 
state variation exists on the question of when an alternative in-
seminator constitutes a father and when he remains a donor. 
That said, a look at these regimes suggests that even within 
 
because the child in question, whom the mother’s husband raised for ten 
years, was the result of a sexual affair rather than of alternative conception). 
 54. 938 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
 55. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 56. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2002) § 102(8). 
 57. Id. § 102(4) (emphasis added). 
 58. Id. § 701. 
 59. Id. (emphasis added). 
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this spectrum of possibilities there exists a binary of sorts: in 
some states more intimate donations result in paternity and 
less intimate donations avoid that legal status. 
Of the states that have a statute addressing alternative in-
semination, some, like Oklahoma and Georgia, make it illegal 
to engage in that method of conception without a physician’s 
assistance.60 Others, like the 1973 UPA,61 require the presence 
of an intermediary—either a physician or a licensed sperm 
bank—in order for a donor to avoid paternity.62 Jurisdictions 
that require physician assistance appear to be motivated, at 
least in part, by reproductive binarism and its distinctions be-
tween intimate (sexual) and non-intimate (alternative) repro-
duction. 
For instance, in Kansas ex rel. J.L.S. v. W.M.,63 a court im-
posed paternity on a man who helped a woman and her female 
partner to become parents through alternative insemination 
but without physician assistance, as Kansas parentage law re-
quires in order for donors to remain donors.64 Notwithstanding 
the fact that the mother and the donor had a written agree-
ment waiving paternity, the court imposed paternity on the do-
 
 60. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-37 (2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 553 
(West 2012). 
 61. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973) (“If, under the supervision of a 
licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated 
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is 
treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 62. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.20.045 (West 2012); CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 7613(b) (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(f ) (2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 257.56 (West 2012).While California’s Parentage Act requires a third-party 
intermediary (doctor, surgeon, or licensed sperm bank) in order for a donor to 
avoid paternity, the Act allows donors and donees who fail to use physician 
assistance to contract out of paternity either orally or in writing. See CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 7613(b)(2). Some of these states follow the 1973 UPA rather than 
the revised UPA, which discarded the physician assistance requirement as 
well as the requirement that the recipient of donor sperm be married. The re-
vised UPA did not, however, discard the requirement that the donation be “as-
sisted” rather than “sexual” in order for the donor to avoid legal paternity. See 
supra notes 25–26. 
 63. Case No. 12D-2686 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Shawnee Cnty., Jan 22, 2014), 
http://www.shawneecourt.org/DocumentCenter/View/468. 
 64. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(f ) (2015) (“The donor of semen provid-
ed to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other 
than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the birth father of a 
child thereby conceived, unless agreed to in writing by the donor and the 
woman.” (emphasis added)). 
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nor—over the objection of all the parties involved65—because he 
and the mother failed to satisfy the physician assistance re-
quirement. Reading Kansas parentage law strictly, the W.M. 
court reasoned that Kansas decided to “limit the application of 
the donor non-paternity provision to instances in which semen 
is provided to a licensed physician.”66 For that reason, the court 
concluded, the donor was a father, with all of the rights and re-
sponsibilities that status entails.67 
The W.M. court relied in large part on a prior California 
decision, Jhordan C. v. Mary K.,68 where a court applied a law 
similar to the Kansas parentage statute—but which has since 
been repealed and replaced with a different parentage stat-
ute—to impose paternity on a donor who was seeking it.69 Like 
the law at issue in V.M., the law at issue in Jhordan C. re-
quired donors to use physician intermediaries in order to main-
tain their donor status.70 Because the donor at issue there pro-
vided semen to an unmarried woman and her “close [female] 
friend”71 without using a physician intermediary, the court held 
that he was a father rather than a donor.72 
Reproductive binarism appears to play a role in these cases 
and in the laws on which they rest. More intimate donations 
(without physician assistance) result in legal paternity, where-
as less intimate donations (with physician assistance) do not. 
While neither of the above-mentioned cases explicitly says so, it 
could be that Kansas (and formerly California) requires third-
 
 65. The state in W.M. was suing the donor after the child’s mother had 
applied to the state for financial assistance. W.M., Case No. 12D-2686, at 2–5. 
By the time the W.M. decision was handed down, the mother and her by then 
former partner had submitted a parenting plan that included provisions for 
private financial support of the child. Id. The mother’s former partner had not 
adopted the child in question, but intervened in the action to establish her le-
gal right to the child. W.M. was therefore not a case where the court imposed 
paternity simply in order to ensure dual financial support of a child. Id. at 6. 
 66. Id. at 9. 
 67. See id. 
 68. 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (Ct. App. 1986). 
 69. The law at issue in Jhordan C., CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(b), was re-
pealed in 2005 and replaced by the law that currently governs assisted repro-
duction. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2012). The old law absolutely re-
quired physician assistance of some kind in order for donors to avoid paternity 
in situations involving unmarried women. The new law also imposes paternity 
in the absence of physician assistance, but allows the parties to contract 
around that rule either orally or in writing. See supra note 62. 
 70. See Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 391–92. 
 71. See id. at 388. 
 72. See id. at 397. 
  
2016] REPRODUCTION RECONCEIVED 633 
 
party assistance in the assisted reproductive context in order to 
render assisted conception sufficiently non-intimate to distin-
guish it from sexual conception. Under this view, physician as-
sistance quite literally de-familiarizes the mechanics of concep-
tion—as well as the donor who helps to facilitate it.73 As Part II 
argues, the history behind the physician assistance require-
ment supports this theory, as states, like the 1973 UPA, im-
plemented the requirement in the 1970s in an effort to draw a 
clear distinction between intimate/sexual life creation and non-
intimate/non-sexual life creation.74 
To be sure, there could be other reasons aside from repro-
ductive binarism for states like California and Kansas to have 
these requirements. One reason, the Jhordan C. court specu-
lated, “relates to health: a physician can obtain a complete 
medical history of the donor (which may be of crucial im-
portance to the child during his or her lifetime) and screen the 
donor for any hereditary or communicable diseases.”75 The se-
cond reason relates to clarifying the intentions of the parties. 
“The presence of a professional third party such as a physi-
cian,” the Jhordan C. court explained, “can serve to create a 
formal, documented structure for the donor-recipient relation-
ship, without which, as this case illustrates, misunderstand-
ings between the parties regarding the nature of their relation-
ship and the donor’s relationship to the child would be more 
likely to occur.”76 
But a closer look at both Jhordan C. and W.M. casts doubt 
on these rationales. The law at issue in Jhordan C. effectively 
required physician assistance for unmarried women only, as a 
separate provision—the paternal presumption—made it impos-
 
 73. It is important to note that reproductive binarism does not character-
ize all states’ approach to paternity determinations in the alternative repro-
ductive setting. For example, while some states require physician assistance 
either for alternative insemination to be legal or for a donor to remain a donor, 
many states, like the contemporary UPA, have dispensed with the require-
ment entirely. As Appleton observes, the physician assistance requirement has 
started “to fade.” Appleton, supra note 50, at 113. Thus, even as reproductive 
binarism undoubtedly plays a role in the law of sexual donation, and appears 
to play a role in the law of alternative reproduction in some states, its influ-
ence over the legal regulation of alternative reproduction is not universal. 
That said, it is important to scrutinize the motivations behind even past mani-
festations of reproductive binarism in order to better grasp what might be an-
imating its contemporary forms. 
 74. See infra Part II.C. 
 75. Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 393. 
 76. Id. 
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sible for a donor to gain legal paternity if he failed to use a phy-
sician in the alternative insemination process with a married 
woman.77 If California were principally concerned with health 
and safety, then presumably the physician assistance require-
ment would have applied across the board. Similarly, the par-
ties in W.M. had a written agreement memorializing their in-
tent; indeed, they had the kind of “formal, documented 
structure for the donor-recipient relationship”78 that Jhordan 
C. speculated was the reason for a physician requirement. Even 
so, the W.M. court still found that the donor was a father rather 
than a donor simply because he and the donee did not satisfy 
the physician assistance requirement. 
The under-inclusiveness of these rationales as applied in 
these cases suggests that reproductive binarism and its pre-
sumptions about intimacy is (or in California’s case, was) moti-
vating jurisdictions to impose the physician assistance re-
quirement. Other states attempt to ‘de-familiarize’ assisted 
conception in even stranger ways. In Bruce v. Boardwine,79 a 
Virginia court last year held that a man was a father rather 
than a donor simply because a woman used a turkey baster ra-
ther than a medical instrument to get pregnant with his semen. 
The narrow issue before the Boardwine court was a question of 
statutory interpretation: whether turkey baster insemination 
qualified as “assisted conception” under Virginia law, which 
treats men who facilitate conception through “intervening med-
ical technology” as donors rather than fathers.80 According to 
that law, “intervening medical technology” includes “but is not 
limited to, conventional medical and surgical treatment as well 
as noncoital reproductive technology such as artificial insemi-
nation by donor.”81 
Ruling in favor of the man, who was seeking paternity, the 
Boardwine court reasoned that “[a]n ordinary kitchen imple-
ment used at home is simply not analogous to the medical 
technologies that are listed in [Virginia’s assisted conception 
statute], nor does it constitute a ‘reproductive’ technology under 
 
 77. Id. at 395. The donee in Jhordan C. argued—unsuccessfully—that 
California’s alternative insemination law violated the Federal Equal Protec-
tion Clause by making an impermissible distinction between married and un-
married women. See id. 
 78. Id. at 393. 
 79. 64 Va. App. 623 (2015). 
 80. See id. at 629. 
 81. Id. 
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the plain meaning of the term.”82 For a man to retain donor sta-
tus in Virginia, then, he must inseminate a woman with a qual-
ifying “medical instrument” rather than with an “ordinary” 
domestic appliance like a turkey baster. Unlike Kansas and 
other states, Virginia does not require men and women to use a 
human intermediary in order to avoid paternity. But like Kan-
sas and other states, it does require them to de-familiarize as-
sisted conception in some way in order to achieve the same re-
sult. 
B. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SEMEN PROVIDERS 
Federal regulation of semen providers reflects and repro-
duces a procreative binary that privileges sexual reproduction 
and relies on a narrow view of what sexual reproduction 
means. According to 21 C.F.R. § 1271, which sets forth the 
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regula-
tions that apply to establishments, like gamete banks, that 
manufacture human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-
based products, an “establishment” that “manufactures” human 
products like (and including) semen is subject to extensive—
and expensive—testing requirements, including testing for 
communicable diseases like HIV and cytomegalovirus.83 Section 
1271 exempts from these requirements donations that will be 
transferred to a “sexually intimate partner,” or “SIP,” of the 
semen donor.84 So, for example, if a man provides semen to a 
fertility provider—a qualifying “establishment”—in order to in-
seminate his wife with medical assistance, then the provider 
need not test the man’s donation, as that donation will be 
transferred to a presumed SIP, the man’s wife. 
Although Section 1271 nowhere defines the term “SIP,”85 
the FDA has recently applied it in a way that suggests that its 
exclusive meaning is a woman who is in a monogamous rela-
tionship with a man that involves sexual intercourse. In 2010, 
the FDA applied Section 1271’s requirements to Trent Arse-
nault, a private sperm donor from San Francisco who had been 
donating semen to women since 2006 without the help of a 
sperm bank or fertility doctor, and on an uncompensated ba-
 
 82. Id. at 631. 
 83. 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2012). 
 84. Id. § 1271.15(e). 
 85. See Amber D. Abbasi, The Curious Case of Trent Arsenault: Question-
ing FDA Regulatory Authority over Private Sperm Donation, 22 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 1, 37 (2013). 
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sis.86 Mr. Arsenault, whose donations led to at least twenty-five 
conceptions and eighteen live births, advertised his services on 
the Internet through the website trentdonor.org.87 While Mr. 
Arsenault was not a sexual sperm donor—he offered the indi-
viduals who procured his services in-person pickup of his se-
men at his house—he argued that he and his clients constitut-
ed “sexually intimate partners” who qualified for the statutory 
exemption for SIPs.88 
In 2012, the FDA Commissioner disagreed. Upholding a 
previous FDA “Order to Cease Manufacture” of semen that was 
directed at Mr. Arsenault, the Commissioner refused to accept 
Mr. Arsenault’s “expanded definition of the term ‘sexually in-
timate partner,’” arguing that to do so would undermine “the 
protections offered by the donor eligibility requirements.”89 Un-
der the Commissioner’s view, sexually intimate partners—
presumably monogamous couples engaged in traditional heter-
osexual intercourse, where the threat of sexually communicable 
disease is ostensibly low—did not need such “protections” be-
cause their intimacy ensured transparency in matters pertain-
ing to sexual health;90 those engaged in less intimate donation 
 
 86. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Form 483 Inspectional Observations 
Report (Sept. 20, 2010), http://trentdonor.org/trentdonor/d/21520-2/FDA-Form 
-483-Inspection-Observations-TrentDonor-20-Sep-2010-5-Pages.pdf [hereinaf-
ter FDA Form 483]. 
 87. See Abbasi, supra note 85, at 17–20. Mr. Arsenault’s website may be 
accessed at http://www.trentdonor.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). 
 88. See Letter from Trent Arsenault to Barbara Cassens and Mary Ma-
larkey, Dirs., FDA (Nov. 1, 2010), http://trentdonor.org/sites/g2sites/ 
trentdonor/d/21459-4/trentdonor-fda-form-483-response-doc-01-nov-2010.pdf. 
Mr. Arsenault has elsewhere referred to himself as a “donorsexual.” David 
Moye, Trent Arsenault, “Donorsexual” Virgin Father of 14 Kids, Answers Your 
Questions, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/02/03/trent-arsenault-donorsexual-sperm-donor-video_n_1251595.html. 
 89. Center for Biologics Evaluation & Research, Memorandum in Support 
of CBER’s Motion to Deny Hearing Request and for Administrative Summary 
Judgment 15, (Feb. 7, 2011), http://trentdonor.com/sites/g2sites/trentdonor/d/ 
21703-2/trentdonor-fda-motion-to-deny-hearing-07feb2010.pdf. 
 90. But the FDA assumes too much. Sexually intimate partners often lie 
about their past and current sexual relations. A 2015 survey conducted by the 
polling company YouGov found that twenty-one percent of men surveyed and 
nineteen percent of women surveyed admitted that they had cheated; seven 
percent of persons surveyed preferred not to respond. Sorting Through the 
Numbers on Infidelity, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 26, 2015), http://www.npr.org/ 
2015/07/26/426434619/sorting-through-the-numbers-on-infidelity. In addition, 
sexually intimate partners often are unaware of the communicable diseases 
that they carry—diseases like Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, which the FDA lists 
as one of the diseases for which non-sexually-intimate donors are tested. See 
FDA Form 483, supra note 86, at 2. The human manifestation of “mad cow” 
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settings, however, did. In effect, the Commissioner found that 
Mr. Arsenault, a private sperm donor, was more like a commer-
cial sperm bank than an individual in a relationship that suffi-
ciently approximated traditional sexual intercourse to qualify 
for the exemption. 
Mr. Arsenault has not challenged the agency’s decision.91 
One of his donees, however, has—unsuccessfully.92 In Doe v. 
Hamburg, a case filed in the federal district court for the 
Northern District of California, the donee argued that the gov-
ernment’s refusal to apply the SIP exemption to her and Mr. 
Arsenault’s relationship violated her constitutional rights to 
privacy and autonomy.93 Her attorney, Amber Abbasi, has ar-
gued in both court filings and a law review article that the 
FDA’s refusal to view private, non-coital sperm donation as 
“sexually intimate” suggests that the FDA is using its regulato-
ry power to “impos[e] its particular set of beliefs about the true 
meaning of a procreative relationship”94 and to privilege a “sub-
set of sexually intimate relationships”95: the relationships of a 
“monogamous couple that regularly engage in sexual inter-
course and do not take part in individual activities that could 
lead to asymmetrical exposure.”96 In so doing, Abbasi main-
tains, the FDA regulations inflict myriad constitutional harms 
on alternative procreators, including “serious harms to individ-
ual autonomy.”97 
 
disease, Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease is a rare, degenerative brain disorder of 
which its carriers are unaware until they are either tested or become sympto-
matic. See Creutzfeldt-Jackob Disease, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic 
.org/diseases-conditions/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease/basics/definition/con 
-20028005 (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). 
 91. See Doe v. Hamburg, No. C-12-3412EMC, 2013 WL 3783749, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. July 16, 2013) (stating that “[t]here is nothing in the record to indi-
cate that Mr. Arsenault has since challenged the Commissioner’s decision”); 
Moye, supra note 88. 
 92. See Hamburg, 2013 WL 3783749, at *1. 
 93. See id. at *4. 
 94. Abbasi, supra note 85, at 28; see also Jacqueline M. Acker, The Case 
for an Unregulated Private Sperm Donation Market, 20 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 
32 (2013). 
 95. Abbasi, supra note 85, at 27. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 28. Abbasi’s right to procreate claim posits that constitutional 
protection for procreation is no less robust when life creation is “noncoital or 
collaborative.” Id. at 34 (citing John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the 
Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 429 
(1982) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty]). Her equal protection ar 
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In July 2013, the Hamburg court dismissed Jane Doe’s 
complaint by invoking the logic of reproductive binarism and 
its belief in the essential difference—in this case, the essential 
constitutional difference—between intimate sexual reproduc-
tion and non-intimate commercial reproduction. The court dis-
missed the case on prudential standing grounds, finding that 
“Ms. Doe asserts no independent rights personal to her.”98 Ra-
ther, the court continued, her rights were merely “derivative of 
Mr. Arsenault’s.” The court dismissed as “specious” the plain-
tiff ’s contention that “she has broader rights independent of 
Mr. Arsenault’s which are violated, such as her general right to 
procreate.”99 “Ms. Doe is not impeded from exercising any gen-
eral constitutional right to procreate or even a more specific 
right (if it exists) to procreate via artificial insemination,”100 the 
court declared. To the contrary, it said, “[t]he only thing Ms. 
Doe is deprived of is the right to have Mr. Arsenault’s child 
specifically through a ‘commercial’ (i.e., nonintimate) relation-
ship.”101 
C. PROPOSED REGULATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE REPRODUCTION 
Reproductive binarism informs numerous proposed regula-
tions of alternative reproduction offered by conservative and 
progressive commentators alike. Dov Fox, for instance, argues 
that the government ought to discourage gamete banks from 
arranging donors on their websites in race-based ways—by, for 
instance, making it easy for users to filter donors based on 
their racial or ethnic background102—by imposing a sin tax or a 
 
gument posits that there is no reasonable basis for distinguishing between 
“artificial insemination” and “natural insemination,” the latter of which enjoys 
complete shelter from the FDA’s regulatory gaze. Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief at 15, Doe v. Hamburg, No. C-12-3412EMC, 2013 WL 
3783749 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2013). Finally, the First Amendment argument 
posits that “[b]y refusing to accept an expanded definition of sexually intimate 
partnership, the FDA has violated the First Amendment rights of intimate as-
sociation of Ms. Doe, other similarly situated women, and willing male donors 
with whom they have chosen to conceive children via artificial insemination.” 
Id. at 15–16. 
 98. Doe v. Hamburg, No. C-12-3412EMC, 2013 WL 3783749, at *8 (N.D. 
Cal. July 16, 2013). 
 99. Id. at *7. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. For an example of this practice, see Donor Search, CAL. CRYOBANK, 
https://cryobank.com/Search (California Cryobank website) (last visited Nov. 
3, 2016). 
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commercial advertising ban on banks that engage in that “per-
nicious social practice[].”103 Similarly, Naomi Cahn, David 
Blankenhorn and others support laws eliminating gamete do-
nor anonymity in order, among other reasons, to reduce the 
possibility of “accidental incest” between donor-conceived kin.104 
Cahn also advocates mandatory caps on gamete donation that 
would limit the number of families to whom a donor may do-
nate his or her gametes,105 as well as the establishment of spe-
cial birth certificates for donor-conceived children that reveal 
the biological origins of their conception.106 
In addition, several commentators support regulating the 
practices of fertility providers no less than the practices of 
gamete banks. Some call for limiting the number of eggs that 
can be harvested from, and implanted in, a woman during any 
single in vitro fertilization (IVF) cycle.107 At least one other, 
 
 103. Dov Fox, Note, Racial Classification in Assisted Reproduction, 118 
YALE L.J. 1844, 1846 (2009) [hereinafter Fox, Racial Classification]; see also 
Dov Fox, Race Sorting in Family Formation, 49 FAM. L.Q. 55 (2015) (criticiz-
ing this practice); Dov Fox, Choosing Your Child’s Race, 22 HASTINGS WOM-
EN’S L.J. 3 (2011) [hereinafter Fox, Choosing Your Child’s Race] (same) . 
 104. See, e.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING 
OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995); NAOMI CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP: 
CONSTRUCTING DONOR-CONCEIVED FAMILIES 129 (2013) [hereinafter CAHN, 
THE NEW KINSHIP]; DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCI-
ENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006); Naomi 
Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 413 (2012) [hereinafter Cahn, The 
New Kinship]; Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpre-
tive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 
904 (2000) [hereinafter Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making]; David 
Blankenhorn, How My View on Gay Marriage Changed, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/how/-my-view-on-gay 
-marriage-changed.html. For a critique of the “accidental incest” argument in 
favor of greater regulation of alternative reproduction, see Cahill, Oedipus 
Hex, supra note 2, passim. 
 105. CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP, supra note 104, at 160–61. 
 106. See Cahn, Do Tell!, supra note 9, at 1104–05. In Cahn’s view, these 
reforms are necessary in order to prevent accidental incest between donor-
conceived children, respect donor-conceived children’s right to know the identi-
ty of their genetic progenitors, alleviate the transmission of hereditary diseas-
es from donors to the offspring of unsuspecting donees, and respect the donor-
conceived community’s desire for familial connection. See generally CAHN, THE 
NEW KINSHIP, supra note 104, passim. 
 107. See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, A View from the Cradle: Tort Law and the 
Private Regulation of Assisted Reproduction, 59 EMORY L.J. 1039 (2010); Na-
omi R. Cahn & Jennifer M. Collins, Eight Is Enough, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COL-
LOQUY 501 (2009); Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1623 (2008). Multiple egg extractions risk not just the health of the 
patient, these commentators argue, but also the health of her eventual off-
spring, who are exposed to a “plethora of medical problems” associated with 
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Michele Goodwin, supports the private regulation of alternative 
reproduction through the expansion of tort law.108 Goodwin 
maintains that the law ought to regulate “reckless reproduc-
tion” no less than it regulates “reckless driving.”109 “When vile 
externalities arise [from ART], including forcing children to 
cope with irreversible disabilities that result from the odious 
manipulation of reproductive specialists or the narcissistic 
choices of their parents,” Goodwin argues, “there must be a 
mechanism for addressing them.”110 That mechanism, she con-
tends, is tort. “Much in the same way that the law recognizes 
personal injury causes of action arising from the use of technol-
ogy, such as cars, trains, and planes, so too should the law rec-
ognize personal injury actions in biotechnology and in ART in 
particular,” she writes.111 
Many, if not most, of these proposals for regulatory reform 
rest on reproductive binarism and its narrow conception of sex 
and intimacy. For instance, in justifying why the government 
ought to penalize race-conscious gamete banks but not race-
conscious dating websites—of which there are many112—Dov 
Fox draws a clear distinction between “intimate” romantic affil-
iation (which dating websites are intended to facilitate) and 
“transactional” alternative reproduction. He says: 
Autonomy interests are implicated differently in assisted reproduc-
tion . . . than they are in sexual reproduction or romantic dating. The 
exchange of money for genetic material provides the means to produce 
a child—a profoundly intimate act to which the donor contributes one-
half of the necessary raw materials. But the relationship between the 
people who directly engage in that procreative act is characterized 
less by intimacy than anonymity. What is present in the romantic 
matching context that is missing in the reproductive matching con-
text is meaningful interface between the parties on either side of the 
 
high-order births, including “low birthweight, . . . cerebral palsy, other disabil-
ities, and death.” Goodwin, supra, at 1052; see also id. at 1058 (discussing 
complications from general anesthesia); id. at 1059–60 (discussing risks of 
ovarian damage and ovarian cancer); Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduc-
tion, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1643 (2008) (recommending limits on em-
bryo transplants). 
 108. See Goodwin, supra note 107, at 1043 (proposing a “paradigm shift” 
that considers “the viability of tort law to address the private and costly harms 
resulting from negligent application of ART”). 
 109. Id. at 1054. 
 110. Id. at 1071. 
 111. Id. at 1089. 
 112. For a discussion of these websites and their explicit racial preferences, 
see Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Acci-
dents of Love and Sex, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1322 (2009). 
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exchange. Prospective parents and sperm donors transact at arm’s 
length through a corporate broker who does not ordinarily permit ei-
ther party even to learn the name of the other, let alone to have in-
terpersonal contact. The market in donor insemination mediates re-
production to eliminate the intimacy that both typifies the 
relationship between consensual procreative partners, and also 
grounds the associational autonomy interests at stake in the act of 
procreation. Dating website [sic] deal in the union of people; sperm 
banks deal in the union of gametes.113 
Fox’s distinction between intimate romantic affiliation and 
transactional alternative reproduction typifies the foundational 
assumptions that underlie many of the proposed regulations 
discussed earlier.114 For instance, in response to the anticipated 
criticism that her proposals for “donor-conceived” birth certifi-
cates treat “donor-conceived children differently from children 
created through sexual reproduction,” Cahn writes that “[t]he 
reality is that they are, in fact, different, and different enough 
to satisfy any level of constitutional scrutiny.”115 While “[e]ven 
children conceived through a one-night stand involve a sexual 
encounter,” she continues, “donor-conceived children require 
the involvement of someone outside the family, a third party 
who is not within the protected sphere of sexually intimate 
conduct.”116 
 
 113. Fox, Racial Classification, supra note 103, at 1882–83 (footnotes omit-
ted); see also Fox, Choosing Your Child’s Race, supra note 103, at 10–11 (dis-
cussing why racially limited dating websites are markedly distinct from racial-
ly limited sperm banks). 
 114. In a forthcoming article on the tort of reproductive negligence, Profes-
sor Fox appraises the differences between sexual and alternative reproduction 
in less stark terms. Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For instance, 
when suggesting that constitutional protection for procreation might not nec-
essarily act as a bar to recovery for reproductive negligence by third-party 
providers of a variety of reproductive services, Fox says: “Constitutionally pro-
tected interests in romantic intimacy may also lose some of their purchase 
when procreation moves from bedroom to laboratory, as do interests in bodily 
integrity in the absence of physical harm or unconsented touch.” Id. (emphasis 
added). Under this view, “romantic intimacy interests” are attenuated, but not 
eliminated, when procreation moves from bedroom to doctor’s office. Id. 
 115. Cahn, Do Tell!, supra note 9, at 1106. 
 116. Id. Elsewhere in that article, Cahn distinguishes between “donor con-
ception” and traditional conception not only by giving the former a different 
name—“donor conception”—but also, like Fox, by juxtaposing the presumed 
intimacy of sexual conception against the presumed non-intimacy of alterna-
tive reproduction. Id. In “donor-conception cases,” Cahn argues, “[a]t least one 
legal parent (and there may only be one) has made a deliberate choice to use a 
third party, unlike in other types of biologically-formed families, when chil-
dren are created through intimate acts.” Id. at 1117 (emphasis added). 
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Similarly, Blankenhorn and his colleagues at the Institute 
for American Values117 posit a factual distinction between al-
ternative reproduction—and the “intentional parenthood” that 
it helps to facilitate—and reproduction “the old-fashioned 
way,”118 as does Goodwin, who rests her proposals for invigorat-
ing tort law to cover a broader field of alternative reproductive 
technology cases on an explicit distinction between alternative 
and traditional procreation. While conceding that parents gen-
erally “do not owe children a promise of perfection,”119 Goodwin 
argues that parents who turn to reproductive technologies 
might be penalized for their actions in a way that “natural” 
procreators cannot (or should not) be. She says: “[T]he key 
question here is the distinction between natural reproduction 
and clinical or assisted reproduction, which are distinctly dif-
ferent.”120 
As with the regulations discussed above, these proposed 
regulations of alternative reproduction flow from three interre-
lated assumptions. First, they assume that sexual procreation 
and alternative reproduction involve factually distinct life-
creating mechanisms. Second, they assume that “natural” life 
creation is intimate in a way that “commercial” life creation is 
not. Third, they assume that these differences regarding me-
chanics and intimacy justify different legal treatment of tradi-
tional and alternative reproduction, as well as the imposition of 
burdensome restrictions on alternative procreators. 
D. EXCEPTIONS TO REPRODUCTIVE BINARISM IN THE LAW 
Exceptions exist with all general trends, and that is no less 
the case with the legal treatment of sexual and alternative re-
production. This Section briefly considers instances where 
 
 117. The Institute for American Values (IAV) is a public policy think tank 
that aims to “renew civil society and end the culture wars” based, in part, on 
the most pressing social issues of a given time. INST. FOR AM. VALUES, http:// 
www.americanvalues.org/about (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). Founded (and led) 
by David Blankenhorn, a former opponent of same-sex marriage and the “star 
witness” for Proposition 8’s proponents in the federal trial over that amend-
ment’s constitutionality, the IAV is critical of non-traditional parenthood for 
the same reasons that it once opposed same-sex marriage, namely because it 
disrupts biological, dual-gender parenting. Frank Rich, Two Weddings, a Di-
vorce, and ‘Glee,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
06/13/opinion/13rich.html. 
 118. MARQUARDT, supra note 8, at 23. 
 119. Goodwin, supra note 107, at 1091–92. 
 120. Id. (emphasis added). 
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courts and commentators have treated sexual and alternative 
reproduction the same (or have advocated the equal treatment 
of them), thereby resisting the general legal trend of treating 
procreation differently depending on the manner in which it oc-
curs. 
Some courts have treated sexual and alternative reproduc-
tion similarly in a line of prisoner reproduction cases, which 
have held that the state does not violate a prisoner’s right to 
procreate by denying him permission to procreate with his wife, 
either through sex or alternative insemination.121 A few schol-
ars have also treated alternative and sexual reproduction simi-
larly, at least in some respects. John Robertson, for instance, 
has argued that the constitutional right to procreate ought to 
extend to a range of alternative reproductive technologies, in-
cluding in vitro fertilization, alternative insemination, and sur-
rogacy.122 The infertile, no less than the fertile, he maintains, 
have an “interest in genetic continuity, in gestating and giving 
birth, and in rearing the offspring.”123 Insofar as the right to 
bear and rear children protects those interests, Robertson con-
tends, it makes little sense to withhold that right from one kind 
of procreation but extend it to another.124 
Like Robertson, other scholars support parity of treatment 
in some respects between sexual and alternative insemination, 
 
 121. See, e.g., Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2002) (situat-
ing alternative insemination on the same plane as other constitutionally pro-
tected forms of intimate association, like sexual intercourse, that are “neces-
sarily” curtailed in prison); Goodwin v. Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (W.D. 
Mo. 1988) (placing artificial insemination alongside other “intimate relation-
ships [that] are severely infringed upon by the nature of incarceration”). 
 122. See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND 
THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994); John A. Robertson, Assisting 
Reproduction, Choosing Genes, and the Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1505 (2008) [hereinafter Robertson, Assisting Re-
production]; Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 97, passim. 
 123. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 97, at 428. 
 124. See, e.g., Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, supra note 122, at 1505 
(stating that “[o]ur developing conceptions of procreative liberty should extend 
protection to gay and lesbian individuals and couples” because they “have the 
same interests in having children that heterosexuals do, and can use ARTs to 
achieve that goal” (emphasis added)); see also Lawrence Wu, Family Planning 
Through Human Cloning: Is There a Fundamental Right?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 
1461, 1487 (1998) (arguing that “[i]dentifying a ‘coital’ couple’s and a 
‘noncoital’ couple’s procreative intent clarifies the similarities of the interests 
involved, because upon close inspection, nothing materially differentiates the 
content of one couple’s intent from another, except the absence of sex to 
achieve procreation” (emphasis added)). 
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although not for all of the reasons advanced here. Susan 
Frelich Appleton, for instance, asks: “[W]hat reasons require 
categorical rejection of a clear written, [sic] agreement of 
nonparentage in [sexual conception] cases—like the contracts 
courts accept for [alternative insemination]?”125 Similarly, Nan-
cy Polikoff supports identical treatment of families “regardless 
of the method of conception.”126 These scholars, however, repre-
sent “a minority view.”127 “The much louder call,” Martha 
Ertman writes, “is for states to meddle in [alternative] 
parenthood”128 but not necessarily in its traditional version. 
Finally, until the 1960s, law and society treated alterna-
tive insemination and sexual procreation analogously. An 
American legal system reluctant to legitimize donor insemina-
tion rejected it by conceptualizing it in illicit sexual terms—as 
“adultery by doctor”129—and by characterizing its resulting off-
spring as “illegitimate.”130 Even users of alternative insemina-
tion viewed it during this time through a sexual lens, partly in 
order to naturalize the procedure and thereby alleviate their 
discomfort with the idea of severing the link between sex and 
procreation.131 The historical conflation of alternative insemina-
tion and sexual intercourse is explained in greater detail below. 
E. SUMMARY 
This Part has surveyed the extent of the law’s dual system 
of reproductive regulation. In addition to revealing the breadth 
 
 125. Appleton, supra note 50, at 113; see also MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S 
PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE ALL KINDS OF 
FAMILIES 59 (2015) (arguing that “family law should honor people’s choices to 
make whatever family arrangements they choose, as long as health and safety 
are protected”); I. Glenn Cohen, Response: Rethinking Sperm-Donor Anonymi-
ty: Of Changed Selves, Nonidentity, and One-Night Stands, 100 GEO. L.J. 431, 
445 (2012) (criticizing Naomi Cahn’s regulatory proposals for implicitly con-
ceding “that reproduction through [reproductive] technologies is a ‘lower sta-
tus’ kind of reproduction, worthy of less protection”). 
 126. Nancy D. Polikoff, Breaking the Link Between Biology and Parental 
Rights in Planned Lesbian Families: When Sperm Donors Are Not Fathers, 2 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 57, 59 (2000). Polikoff argues that the law ought to “pro-
vide a mechanism, for both children conceived coitally and those conceived 
through donor insemination, facilitating recognition of the mother-child unit 
as a family without a father, the same status accorded the family of a single 
woman who adopts a child.” Id. 
 127. ERTMAN, supra note 125, at 60. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Swanson, supra note 16, at 593. 
 130. Id. at 621. 
 131. See infra Part II.C. 
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of reproductive binarism in the law, Part I has shown how re-
productive binarism is an equal-opportunity discipliner, impos-
ing burdens on alternative procreators from which sexual pro-
creators are exempt and vice versa. For instance, the supposed 
intimacy that renders contractual bargaining unreliable in the 
sexual conception context protects it from excessive govern-
mental regulation. By contrast, the supposed lack of intimacy 
that renders contractual bargaining reliable in the alternative 
conception context exposes it to significant governmental med-
dling and interference.132 Parts III and IV will return to the rel-
ative hardships that reproductive binarism imposes on alterna-
tive as well as sexual procreators, and to the factual and 
constitutional reasons why those hardships ought to provoke 
our skepticism. 
II.  REPRODUCTIVE BINARISM EXPLAINED   
Part I demonstrated the pervasive influence of reproduc-
tive binarism on family law and on the law of alternative re-
production. Part II now offers possible explanations for repro-
ductive binarism, including constitutional, conceptual, and 
historical explanations. 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION 
Reproductive binarism, particularly as it burdens alterna-
tive procreators, is in large part a product of the belief that al-
ternative reproduction merits less constitutional protection 
than sexual conception. Scholars who support alternative re-
productive regulation often justify their proposals by centering 
on the constitutional status of procreation in general and alter-
native reproduction in particular. They variously contend that 
Skinner v. Oklahoma,133 the Supreme Court’s “right to procre-
ate” case that struck down a mandatory sterilization law on 
equal protection grounds,134 “says little about the importance or 
 
 132. See Appleton, supra note 50, at 93–94 (discussing the burdens and 
freedoms that the law selectively applies to sexual and alternative reproduc-
tion). 
 133. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 134. Because Skinner struck down Oklahoma’s involuntary sterilization 
law on equal protection rather than on due process grounds, some—though by 
no means all—scholars argue that it at most establishes an equality right in 
procreative matters. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technology and Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1462 
(2008). In Rao’s view, Skinner stands for the proposition that the state cannot 
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value of reproduction or the right to reproduce,”135 says nothing 
about whether that right includes alternative reproduction,136 
and at most prohibits the government from regulating alterna-
tive reproductive technologies in unequal ways—not from regu-
lating alternative reproductive technologies for everyone.137 
The constitutional explanation for reproductive binarism 
offers only partial explanatory power. It explains why some 
scholars are willing to tolerate regulation of one form of repro-
duction and not similar regulations of another, but fails to pro-
vide any insight as to why they believe that alternative repro-
duction is constitutionally inferior in the first place. To 
understand the deeper logic of reproductive binarism (and the 
constitutional arguments that support it) we must turn else-
where: to the conceptual and historical reasons for the nearly 
habitual belief that alternative and sexual conception are fac-
tually distinct, and therefore deserving of different constitu-
tional and regulatory treatment. 
B. CONCEPTUAL EXPLANATIONS 
1. Sex Exceptionalism 
Reproductive binarism reflects and replicates sex 
exceptionalism: the belief that sex, defined in traditional heter-
osexual terms, is unique in a way that merits different, and of-
ten privileged, legal treatment. From the regulation of mar-
riage and intimate agreements to the punishment of sex work, 
 
single out particular groups (like gays and lesbians) when regulating alterna-
tive reproduction, but may regulate alternative reproduction for everyone. 
Other scholars read Skinner as establishing a more expansive liberty right. 
See Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, supra note 122, at 1493 (arguing that 
“[a]lthough [Skinner] couched its decision in the language of equality . . . the 
rhetoric of a liberty right to reproduce . . . explains the frequency with which 
the case is now cited”). 
 135. Goodwin, supra note 107, at 1089. 
 136. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 424 (2012) 
(“As a constitutional matter, the parameters of a procreative right concerning 
assisted reproduction are less than clear.”); Fox, Racial Classification, supra 
note 103, at 1882 (observing that “[t]he Supreme Court has not considered 
whether autonomy or privacy rights encompass decisions involving the use of 
assisted reproductive technologies”); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitu-
tional Right To Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 993–94 (2002). 
 137. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 134, at 1460 (“[T]he government could pro-
hibit use of a particular reproductive technology across the board for everyone; 
however, once the state permits use in some contexts, it should not be able to 
forbid use of the same technology in other contexts. Hence, all persons must 
possess an equal right, even if no one retains an absolute right, to use ARTs.”). 
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sexual assault, and sex offenders, the law, like society general-
ly, treats sex and sexual conduct as different in kind from other 
varieties of conduct. Indeed, “[e]ven language itself holds sex in 
high esteem: The phrase ‘make love’ stands in for ‘have sex,’ as 
if it’s the only true way to express love,”138 a self-identified 
asexual writes. Sex exceptionalism travels across multiple legal 
domains and comprises two related aspects: (1) sex as differ-
ent/unique; and (2) sex as special/privileged. 
a. Sex as Different/Unique 
The first aspect of sex exceptionalism—the belief that sex 
is different or unique—guides family law’s treatment of mar-
riage, and, in some cases, of non-marital intimate relationships. 
While sex is not a requirement to enter into a marriage, it is a 
basis for terminating one: one spouse’s inability or unwilling-
ness to engage in sex, specifically and narrowly defined,139 with 
the other spouse is grounds for annulment in most jurisdic-
tions;140 in some jurisdictions, it is grounds for divorce.141 As one 
commentator notes, “The validity of marriage is . . . contingent 
upon the capacity of both partners to engage in complete sexual 
intercourse,”142 and marriages might be annulled for failure to 
consummate, regardless of whether fraudulent intent not to 
consummate at the outset of marriage was present.143 Indeed, 
“[t]he desire, or at least initial willingness, of both parties to 
engage in sexual intercourse is considered so basic to mar-
riage”144 that courts will refuse even to honor pre-marital 
agreements that limit sexual intercourse during marriage,145 or 
 
 138. Kim Kaletsky, Asexual and Happy, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/05/fashion/asexual-and-happy.html?_r=0. 
 139. See, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) 
(holding that a marriage between a man and a transgender woman who had 
gender confirmation surgery was valid in New Jersey because the surgery 
rendered her able to satisfy the essence of marriage with her husband: hetero-
sexual coitus); Laurence Drew Borten, Note, Sex, Procreation, and the State 
Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1089, 1099 (2002) (observing that 
“courts have been quite narrow and excruciatingly precise in describing exact-
ly what is meant by sexual capacity with respect to its consequence: the ability 
of the husband to fully penetrate his wife without pain” (footnote omitted)). 
 140. Borten, supra note 139, at 1100–03. 
 141. Id. at 1122–23. 
 142. Id. at 1100; see also Emens, supra note 7, at 351. 
 143. Borten, supra note 139, at 1104–08. 
 144. Id. at 1103. 
 145. See, e.g., Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. Ct. App. 1976). 
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that delay consummation for some time after marriage,146 on 
the ground that such agreements interfere with the marriage 
contract’s sexual essence.147 
As with remaining in (or entering into) marital and cohab-
itant relationships, family law treats sex as different/unique in 
its posture toward cohabitant, or “Marvin,” agreements, which 
courts tend to uphold unless they are predicated on sex.148 “The 
law of contracts, in principle at least, prides itself on not look-
ing inside the ‘black box’ of consideration—leaving it to parties 
to place their own valuations on particular deals,”149 Emens 
writes. “Sex is one notable exception to that general princi-
ple.”150 
Sex exceptionalism emerges in criminal law no less than it 
does in family law. Some criminal incest prohibitions single out 
not just sex between certain family members, but a remarkably 
narrow definition of sex: penetrative sex between opposite-sex 
persons.151 Criminal adultery statutes in some jurisdictions do 
the same, defining the crime of adultery as not just sexual in-
 
 146. Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605 (N.Y. 1926). 
 147. For a more detailed discussion of these and other cases that consider 
married couples’ attempts to contract around marriage’s sexual default rules, 
see Borten, supra note 139, at 1106. As with marriage, sex is a defining at-
tribute of domestic partnerships; thus, some jurisdictions require sex in order 
to grant legal recognition to a domestic partnership. Emens, supra note 7, at 
353 (noting that some domestic partnership regimes “appear to require sexual 
consummation”). 
 148. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 114 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (holding 
that cohabitation contracts were valid in California “unless expressly and in-
separably based upon an illicit consideration of sexual services” (emphasis 
added)). 
 149. Emens, supra note 7, at 356. 
 150. Id. Speaking to the potential effects that sex exceptionalism might 
have on asexuals, Emens continues: “[T]reating sex as special under law may 
do more than reflect the assumptions of a sexual society; rather, special legal 
treatment for sex may reinforce the specialness of sex as a cultural matter.” Id. 
 151. For instance, Florida’s criminal incest statute provides that 
“[w]hoever knowingly marries or has sexual intercourse with a person to 
whom he or she is related by lineal consanguinity, or a brother, sister, uncle, 
aunt, nephew, or niece, commits incest, which constitutes a felony of the third 
degree.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 826.04 (West 2016). Florida defines “sexual inter-
course,” in turn, as “the penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex 
organ, however slight; emission of semen is not required.” Id.; see also Carnes 
v. State, 725 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam) (stating 
that “[t]he obvious purpose of the incest statute is to address the evil of sexual 
intercourse between persons who are related to each other within specific de-
grees” (emphasis added)). 
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tercourse but heterosexual coitus specifically.152 In addition, the 
criminal laws in nearly every jurisdiction prohibit sex work153 
but allow equally “demeaning,” “intense,” and “tiring” work, 
such as plucking chickens.154 They also “assign[] harsher penal-
ties to unwanted [sexual] touching and other [sexual] interac-
tion than non-sexual versions of those same interactions would 
trigger.”155 Finally, sex offenses—broadly conceived—inspire 
singular disgust. “No other crime invokes such negative public 
perceptions,”156 sociologists write. 
b. Sex as Special/Privileged 
The second aspect of sex exceptionalism—the belief that 
sex ought to be privileged—flows directly from the first aspect. 
Sexual harassment law exhibits this aspect of sex 
exceptionalism by over-protecting individuals from certain sex-
ual conduct and under-protecting them from non-sexual forms 
of discrimination.157 Family law does so as well by assuming 
that sex—unlike other conduct, like procreation—is essential to 
the marital relation. Before the advent of no-fault divorce, 
which made unilateral exit from marriage relatively easy, uni-
lateral exit through annulment was permitted for those who 
 
 152. See In re Blanchflower, 434 A.2d 1010, 1012 (N.H. 2003) (holding that 
under New Hampshire’s criminal adultery statute, “‘adultery’ excludes all 
non-coital sex acts”). 
 153. Danielle Augustson & Alyssa George, Prostitution and Sex Work, 16 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 229, 232 (2015) (observing that “[p]rostitution is illegal 
in every state, with certain exceptions in Nevada and, until November 2009, in 
Rhode Island” (footnote omitted)). 
 154. Martha C. Nussbaum, “Whether from Reason or Prejudice”: Taking 
Money for Bodily Services, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 693, 700–02 (1998). 
 155. Emens, supra note 7, at 356–57. While some commentators argue that 
“the basic concept of rape as an independent and exceedingly heinous crime is 
a form of paternalism, inseparable from antiquated notions of female chastity 
and delicacy,” others maintain that the conventional view that “rape is a 
uniquely devastating type of assault still seems to be valid.” David P. Bryden, 
Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 433 (2000). 
 156. James F. Quinn et al., Societal Reaction to Sex Offenders: A Review of 
the Origins and Results of the Myths Surrounding Their Crimes and Treat-
ment Amenability, 25 DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 215, 217 (2004); see also Corey Ray-
burn Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventative Detention, 101 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969 (2011). 
 157. For sexual harassment law’s simultaneous under-protection/over-
protection problem, see Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 
2061, 2065 (2003) (“[T]he same focus on sexual conduct that has led courts to 
ignore . . . larger patterns of sexism and discrimination is also leading compa-
nies to prohibit a broad range of relatively harmless sexual conduct, even 
when that conduct does not threaten gender equality on the job.”). 
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experienced sexual dissatisfaction. Such exit was not necessari-
ly permitted, though, for those who experienced other species of 
discontent.158 
c. Reproductive Binarism and Sex Exceptionalism 
Sex exceptionalism underlies the sex/non-sex binary as 
well as the laws, actual and proposed, that flow from it. For in-
stance, the belief that sexual reproduction is both different 
from and better than alternative reproduction animated laws 
that excluded same-sex couples from marriage until just recent-
ly.159 
That same belief continues to animate the dominant legal 
approach to alternative reproduction. Paternity laws treat sex-
ual and alternative procreation differently by imposing father-
hood after sex but not necessarily after alternative insemina-
tion, and the FDA privileges sex by exempting donations 
between “sexually intimate partners,” narrowly conceived, from 
its mandatory testing requirements. Similarly, all of the pro-
posed regulations considered earlier assume essential differ-
ences between sexual and alternative reproduction, one pre-
sumptively intimate and the other presumptively non-intimate, 
and privilege sexual conception by suggesting that it ought to 
be entitled to greater constitutional protection—and lesser 
state interference—than alternative reproduction.160 
2. Intimacy Essentialism 
Reproductive binarism also reflects and replicates intimacy 
essentialism. Co-extensive with sex exceptionalism, intimacy 
essentialism is the belief that intimacy is—and ought to be—
 
 158. See Borten, supra note 139, at 1104–08. 
 159. As one version of the now-discredited procreation rationale for exclu-
sionary marriage laws asserted: “[I]ndividual adults are naturally incomplete 
with respect to one biological function: sexual reproduction. In coitus, but not 
in other forms of sexual contact, a man and a woman’s bodies coordinate by 
way of their sexual organs for the common biological purpose of reproduction.” 
Sherif Girgis et al., What Is Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245, 254 
(2010); see also Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Lib-
eral Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301, 302 (1995) (arguing that individuals who 
engage in sexual acts other than traditional sexual coitus “treat their bodies 
. . . as means or instruments in ways that damage their personal (and inter-
personal) integrity” (footnote omitted)). 
 160. See, e.g., Fox, Racial Classification, supra note 103, at 1882 (arguing 
that “[a]utonomy interests are implicated differently in assisted reproduction 
. . . than they are in sexual reproduction or romantic dating”). 
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non-commercial, private, and dyadic rather than commercial, 
public, and polyadic.161 Resting on a narrow and particularized 
conception of both “intimacy” and “commerce,” intimacy essen-
tialism is the artifact of a Victorian ideology that viewed family 
and markets as incompatible “separate spheres.”162 Intimacy 
essentialism informs countless legal debates, from those sur-
rounding the criminal prohibition of sex work163 and polyga-
my164 to those surrounding the sale of body parts,165 and it 
drives large swathes of family law.166 Even as it obscures the 
significant overlap that exists between family and markets,167 
intimacy essentialism remains one of family’ law’s most deeply 
rooted canons. 
Just as intimacy essentialism persists in family law more 
generally, so too does it “linger[] on”168 in the legal treatment of 
alternative reproduction, from bioethical and legal debates over 
gamete donor compensation and the moral status of surrogacy 
agreements to judicial resolution of embryo disputes.169 It also 
persists in judicial, legislative, and scholarly treatment of the 
 
 161. Intimacy essentialism is also the belief that certain forms of intima-
cy—namely sexual intimacy—are superior to other forms, like emotional inti-
macy. To the extent that that aspect of intimacy essentialism is a by-product 
of sex exceptionalism, it was addressed above and will not be revisited here (at 
least directly). 
 162. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate Agree-
ments, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 159, 180 (2013) (arguing that separate 
spheres were “rooted in the protection of the marital relationship from the de-
basing influences of the market”). 
 163. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 276–85 (1999); 
Emens, supra note 7, at 354; Nussbaum, supra note 154. 
 164. See Davis, supra note 12, at 2033–35. 
 165. See generally Meredith M. Render, The Law of the Body, 62 EMORY 
L.J. 549 (2013) (discussing the need for a property framework to explain the 
legal status of the human body). 
 166. See Emens, supra note 7, at 355–56. 
 167. See generally Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the 
Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001) (explaining 
the commonalities between business and family structures). 
 168. Matsumura, supra note 162. 
 169. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 140–48 (1996); 
Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1756–65 (2010) 
(discussing legal debates over compensated egg donation); Matsumura, supra 
note 162, at 181–83 (discussing the “separate spheres” logic on which courts 
rely when refusing to enforce embryo agreements between intimates); Douglas 
NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood 38 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (arguing that states that “proscribe only compensated surrogacy” fol-
low “an approach [that] discipline[s] a woman who transgresses ‘separate 
spheres’ ideology when she converts the private domain of the home into the 
public sphere of the market”). 
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issues covered so far in this Article. Recall the Doe v. Hamburg 
court’s statement that the FDA regulations at issue in that case 
did not deprive the plaintiff-donee of “any general constitution-
al right to procreate” because she was procreating through 
what the court viewed as commercial means.170 “The only thing 
Ms. Doe is deprived of,” the court declared, “is the right to have 
Mr. Arsenault’s child specifically through a ‘commercial’ (i.e., 
nonintimate) relationship.”171 Reminiscent of the judicial rheto-
ric of an earlier era, the Hamburg court’s reasoning betokens 
an ideology of “separate spheres” and furthers the belief that 
commerce and intimacy are radically distinct.172 Under this 
view, intimacy connotes something other than commerce, and 
vice versa. 
In addition, intimacy essentialism and its ideology of “sep-
arate spheres” animate paternity determinations in most states 
as well as recent proposals to regulate alternative reproduction. 
States rely on intimacy essentialism when finding that repro-
duction that is more intimate, familiar, and private tends to re-
sult in familial status, whereas reproduction that is less inti-
mate, familiar, and private tends to avoid it.173 Fox also relies 
on intimacy essentialism when he differentiates between com-
mercial dating sites and commercial gamete banks, the latter of 
which “mediate[] the practice of reproduction to eliminate the 
intimacy—and with it the relational autonomy interests—that 
characterize the connection between consensual sexual part-
ners.”174 Cahn does as well when she argues that alternative 
reproduction can be regulated because it “require[s] the in-
volvement of someone outside the family, a third party who is 
not within the protected sphere of sexually intimate conduct.”175 
 
 170. Doe v. Hamburg, Case No. 12D-2686, 2013 WL 3783749, at *6 (N.D. 
Cal. July 16, 2013). 
 171. Id. at *6–7. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See supra Part I.A. 
 174. Fox, Choosing Your Child’s Race, supra note 103, at 11; See also Fox, 
Racial Classification, supra note 103, at 1883. 
 175. Cahn, Do Tell!, supra note 9 at 1106. Intimacy essentialism is also re-
flected in the argument that alternative reproduction can be subject to gov-
ernmental regulation because it is more “public” than “private” sexual repro-
duction. See Michael H. Shapiro, I Want a Girl (Boy) Just Like the Girl (Boy) 
that Married Dear Old Dad (Mom): Cloning Lives, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 
71 (1999) (stating that under one view the so-called “public” aspect of alterna-
tive reproduction renders it susceptible to regulation because “[w]e often re-
gard market transactions involving ‘commodities’—products or services—as 
having strong ‘public’ aspects subject to governmental regulation that is easily 
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C. HISTORICAL EXPLANATION 
As suggested earlier, reproductive binarism could be the 
living artifact of the legal and cultural transformation of alter-
native insemination from an illicit to a licit activity.176 Until the 
1970s, alternative insemination was conceptualized in sexual 
terms, with courts and commentators likening it to adultery177 
and deeming the resulting children “illegitimate.”178 Indeed, 
even the medical establishment followed certain protocols to 
“sexualize” alternative insemination.179  
For instance, prior to the procedure doctors insisted that 
women engage in sexual intercourse in order “to achieve artifi-
cial procreation in conditions that resemble[d] conception 
through sexual intercourse.”180 They also sexualized and natu-
ralized the “artificial” process by having the husband adminis-
ter the syringe181 and by using anesthesia, a pain blocker that 
“was not a necessary component of this simple, unpainful pro-
cedure.”182 “The connection between sex and procreation was 
apparently so deeply embedded in social morality that there 
was a need to purposefully insert an element of sex into the ar-
tificial procedure,” Gaia Bernstein writes.183 “Rendering the 
wife unconscious served both the purpose of controlling her 
sexuality while another men’s [sic] sperm was injected and of 
sparing her from fully facing the artificiality of the act,”184 she 
continues. 
 
justified as against constitutional claims of right”); see also Garrison, Law 
Making for Baby Making, supra note 104, at 849–50 (discussing judicial and 
legislative responses to legal issues surrounding IVF); Rao, supra note 134, at 
1473 (arguing that “the government may regulate ARTs so long as they in-
volve embryos or fetuses that are viable or outside a woman’s body” (emphasis 
added)). 
 176. See Swanson, supra note 16, at 594. 
 177. On this question, see Swanson, supra note 16, at 618 (observing that 
under some courts’ reasoning, “the married mother of a donor child was guilty 
of adultery, and perhaps the donor was as well. Maybe it was the doctor who 
committed adultery, as he injected the sperm. If he was not a direct party to 
adultery, perhaps the doctor’s involvement might fit under the legal definition 
of conspiracy to commit a crime”). 
 178. Id.  
 179. Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A 
Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1064 (2002). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1050. 
 182. Id. at 1058. 
 183. Id. at 1050. 
 184. Id. at 1058. 
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The 1960s and 1970s witnessed important legal develop-
ments that led to the legitimization—and simultaneous de-
sexualization—of alternative insemination.185 The advent and 
legalization of the pill, which was “the peak of the process of 
the removal of reproduction from sex,” also “affected the paral-
lel revolution of the removal of sex from reproduction.”186 Simi-
larly, a landmark decision from the California Supreme Court 
in 1968, People v. Sorensen,187 held that it was “patently absurd 
. . . to consider [alternative insemination] adultery.”188 Finally, 
in 1973, the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) legitimized alterna-
tive insemination when performed by a doctor on a married 
woman,189 and “[b]y the end of the 1970s at least fifteen states 
had statutes regulating [alternative insemination] and specifi-
cally mentioning [alternative insemination by donor].”190 
In legitimizing alternative insemination, regulators and 
commentators simultaneously de-sexualized it. Like the UPA, 
states that passed alternative insemination statutes made clear 
that the legality of the procedure depended on whether a third-
party intermediary—specifically, a doctor—participated in life 
creation.191 As Kara Swanson explains: “The participation of a 
doctor did the cultural work of transforming what some consid-
ered a variation of adultery into a treatment for infertility, that 
is, ‘sin into therapy.’”192 
The separation of alternative insemination and sex contin-
ued into the 1990s and 2000s, which witnessed the prolifera-
tion of the “artificial insemination by intercourse” argument 
considered in Part I.193 In rejecting that argument, courts 
“refus[ed] to equate the [sexual insemination] situation with 
that of a donor through [alternative insemination].”194 That re-
fusal, Bernstein contends, “points to the limits of [alternative 
insemination’s] acceptance—[alternative insemination] has not 
to this day achieved equal standing with sexual intercourse.”195 
 
 185. Id. at 1084–85. 
 186. Id. 
 187. People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 501 (Cal. 1968). 
 188. Id. 
 189. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973). 
 190. Bernstein, supra note 179, at 1090. 
 191. See id.  
 192. KARA W. SWANSON, BANKING ON THE BODY: THE MARKET IN BLOOD, 
MILK, AND SPERM IN MODERN AMERICA 225 (2014). 
 193. Bernstein, supra note 180, at 1091. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. at 1091–92. 
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Bernstein is right to suggest that the judicial rejection of 
the “artificial insemination by intercourse” argument indicates 
that alternative reproduction has not “achieved equal standing 
with sexual intercourse.” But the reverse is also true, namely 
that sexual intercourse has not “achieved equal standing” with 
alternative insemination. As explored in Part I, reproductive 
binarism burdens—albeit in different ways—sexual and alter-
native reproduction. Just as alternative reproduction is saddled 
with regulations and requirements from which sexual inter-
course is largely, if not completely, exempt, so too is sexual pro-
creation burdened with requirements from which alternative 
procreation is largely, if not completely, exempt.196 
It is therefore more accurate to say that the disaggregation 
of sexual intercourse and alternative insemination has resulted 
in a situation where the law treats sexual and alternative in-
semination differently on the presumption that the two are fac-
tually distinct. Often this different treatment—the very defini-
tion of reproductive binarism—burdens alternative procreation. 
But sometimes it burdens sexual reproduction as well. 
III.  CHALLENGING THE BINARY: FACTUAL 
INACCURACIES   
This Article now moves from Part I and II’s descriptive and 
explanatory account of the law’s sex/non-sex binary to Part III 
and IV’s interrogation of it. Part III begins that challenge by 
arguing that sexual and alternative reproduction are more for-
mally similar than the sex/non-sex binary assumes. Section A 
demonstrates that sexual and alternative reproduction are cat-
egories that share a number of common attributes. Section B 
demonstrates that in some instances sexual and alternative re-
production are the same thing. The objective of this Part is two-
fold: first, to show that the factors on which the law relies to 
justify a dual system of reproductive regulation could just as 
easily describe one form of procreation as another; and second, 
to argue that those factors are ultimately insufficient to sustain 
that dual system because they are vague, imprecise, and sus-
ceptible to inconsistent applications. 
 
 196. See Appleton, supra note 50, at 93–94. 
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A. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SEXUAL AND ALTERNATIVE 
REPRODUCTION 
Commentators who support a dual system of reproductive 
regulation argue that alternative and sexual reproduction dif-
fer in essential ways that are (or ought to be) legally relevant. 
First, they argue that alternative reproduction requires out-
side, third-party assistance and is likely to involve anonymous 
interactions between strangers. Second, they argue that alter-
native reproduction is commercial and therefore presumptively 
non-intimate. Cahn invokes these characteristics when she 
writes that unlike sexually conceived children, “donor-
conceived children require the involvement of someone outside 
the family, a third party who is not within the protected sphere 
of sexually intimate conduct.”197 Fox does as well when he ar-
gues that “[a]utonomy interests are implicated differently in 
assisted reproduction . . . than they are in sexual reproduction 
or romantic dating.”198 Unlike the “romantic matching context,” 
Fox maintains, alternative reproduction “is characterized less 
by intimacy than anonymity.”199 
Even scholars who support private ordering in alternative 
reproductive matters tend to assume that alternative reproduc-
tion “unbundles” procreation and intimacy in novel ways that 
distinguish it from sexual reproduction.200 For instance, Marjo-
rie Shultz supports intent-based parenthood, but argues that it 
ought to be limited to “artificial or assisted reproduction.”201 In 
justifying procreative intentionality for assisted but not for 
sexual reproduction, Shultz adverts to intimacy: whereas “ordi-
nary procreation” involves sexual relationships between inti-
mates (for whom intent-based parenthood through contract is 
 
 197. Cahn, Do Tell!, supra note 9 at 1106. 
 198. Fox, Racial Classification, supra note 103, at 1882. 
 199. Id. at 1883. 
 200. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-
Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 
297, 299–300 (stating that “because processes that previously were bundled 
can now be separated, procreation can be depersonalized: biological reproduc-
tion can be separated from the social and physical context of interpersonal in-
timacy” (emphasis added)); id. at 311 (stating that reproductive technology 
offers the possibility that “procreation can be separated from sexual intima-
cy”). Professor Shultz’s arguments assume that alternative reproduction in-
troduces a novel aspect into reproduction generally: the separation of procrea-
tion and “interpersonal intimacy.” Id. at 315. 
 201. Id. at 323–24. 
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unsuitable, in Shultz’s view),202 alternative reproduction in-
volves “deliberative” and planned interactions between “non-
intimates” (for whom intent-based parenthood through contract 
is entirely appropriate).203 
A moment’s reflection reveals the problems with Shultz’s 
and others’ use of sex as a proxy for conventional understand-
ings of non-commerciality, privacy and intimacy. Reproduction 
the “old-fashioned way” can be assisted and non-intimate in 
ways ordinarily associated with “assisted” reproduction, as 
Subsection 1 argues. Moreover, “assisted” reproduction can be 
intimate and unpredictable in ways typically associated with 
sexual reproduction, as Subsection 2 reveals. 
1. Assisted, Non-Intimate Sexual Reproduction 
Sexual reproduction is no less “assisted” than “assisted” 
reproduction. Indeed, the very phrase “assisted reproduction”204 
obscures the basic fact that all human reproduction is “assist-
ed” in some way, as parthenogenesis, like Athena springing 
from Zeus’ head or Typhon issuing from Hera, is humanly im-
possible.205 Considered from the point of view of the right hold-
er—the individual who desires to procreate—all procreation re-
quires “assistance.” Proposals to regulate alternative 
reproduction that are predicated, either in whole or in part, on 
 
 202. See id. at 325. 
 203. See id. at 324. 
 204. Most commentators refer to alternative reproduction as “assisted re-
production” rather than the less inaccurate “alternative reproduction.” See, 
e.g., Cahn, Do Tell!, supra note 9, at 1080 (referencing “assisted reproductive 
technology”); Fox, Racial Classification, supra note 103 (referencing “assisted 
reproduction”); Goodwin, supra note 107, at 1042 (referring to “assisted repro-
ductive technology”); Robertson, supra note 122, passim (referencing “assisted 
reproduction”). But see Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?, su-
pra note 14, at 80 (using “alternative insemination” rather than “assisted in-
semination”). 
 205. The goddess Athena is often cited as an example of male parthenogen-
esis, as she sprung from Zeus’ head. However, it is more accurate to say that 
Athena is an example of female parthenogenesis, as she was originally con-
ceived by Metis, Zeus’ first wife, with no assistance. Angry with Metis for be-
ing pregnant with a child allegedly more powerful than him, Zeus consumed 
Metis—and, along with her, the unborn Athena. Months later, Zeus “gave 
birth” to Athena when the latter sprung from his head. While Hesiod’s 
Theogony reports that Typhon was the son of Gaia (Earth) and Tartarus, the 
later Homeric Hymn to Apollo explains Typhon’s conception in 
parthenogenetic terms. Angry at her husband for birthing Athena by himself, 
Hera prayed to Gaia to give her a son; Hera become pregnant with Typhon af-
ter slapping the ground. See HESIOD, THEOGONY (Richard S. Caldwell trans., 
1987); HOMERIC HYMNS (Sarah Ruden trans., 2005). 
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the belief that third-party assistance renders procreative con-
duct more susceptible to state regulation fail to recognize that 
the difference between “third-party” and “second-party” repro-
duction is one of degree (if even that), not one of kind.206 
More specifically, though, sexual reproduction often re-
quires the kind of assistance—commercial, “third-party” assis-
tance—that people ordinarily associate with alternative repro-
duction. For example, surveys suggest that a not insignificant 
number of individuals are thinking of someone else while hav-
ing sex and are doing so in order to have sex.207 In addition, 
whole industries exist—sex aid pharmaceuticals, pornography, 
sex toys, sex therapy—for the purpose of facilitating sexual de-
sire and sexual intercourse.208 To the extent that procreation is 
the by-product, whether intentional or not, of that intercourse, 
it cannot be said that alternative reproduction is radically dif-
ferent than sexual procreation because of the third-party assis-
tance and commerce that it involves. All of the above-
mentioned industries illuminate the commercial character of 
sexual reproduction, as well as the role that third-party inter-
mediaries often play in facilitating it. As such, arguments to 
regulate alternative reproduction on the ground that it involves 
 
 206. That is, the phrase “third-party” reproduction conceals the fact that 
much of the time reproduction with donated gametic materials—the conven-
tional definition of “third-party” reproduction—occurs, like sex, between just 
two parties: a sperm donor and a single woman. Julie Shapiro observes that 
“the term ‘third-party’ [reproduction] can be a little misleading [because] 
[w]hen a single woman uses sperm from a sperm bank to have a child, she’s 
the first party and the provider of the sperm is a third party and there isn’t 
any second party.” Julie Shapiro, What Should the Rules Be: Thoughts About 
Third-Party Reproduction, WORDPRESS (Nov. 17, 2011), https://julieshapiro 
.wordpress.com/2011/11/17/what-should-the-rules-be-thoughts-about-third 
-party-reproduction. Alternatively, one could think about the single woman as 
the “first party” and the sperm donor as the “second party.” According to the 
California Cryobank, one of the nation’s largest sperm banks, single women 
comprise thirty percent of its business and that figure is projected to be “more 
than 60 percent . . . in 20 years.” Carlos Frías, Single Women Who Choose Arti-
ficial Insemination Can Learn A Lot About Their Sperm Partner, 
PALMBEACHPOST.COM (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/ 
lifestyles/health/single-women-who-choose-artificial-insemination-ca/nL9Wt. 
 207. See, e.g., Harold Leitenberg & Kris Henning, Sexual Fantasy, 117 
PSYCH. BULL. 469, 481 (1995). See generally The American Sex Survey: A Peek 
Beneath the Sheets, ABC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2004), http://abcnews.go.com/images/ 
Politics/959a1AmericanSexSurvey.pdf (providing statistics on Americans’ sex 
lives). 
 208. See generally DAGMAR HERZOG, SEX IN CRISIS: THE NEW SEXUAL REV-
OLUTION AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2008) (discussing the 
Christian right’s influence on sexuality). 
  
2016] REPRODUCTION RECONCEIVED 659 
 
commercial, “third-party” assistance overlook the fact that sex-
ual reproduction often is commercial, “third-party” reproduc-
tion. 
Second, just as sexual reproduction often requires third-
party assistance, so too can it result from deliberate, non-
intimate, mechanistic, and anonymous interactions—the very 
qualities that ostensibly render alternative reproduction sus-
ceptible to regulation. Not all sex, procreative or not, is inti-
mate and carefree (indeed, one need only think here of rape); 
nor is it all non-anonymous. Some people, in fact, desire artful, 
non-intimate, anonymous sex,209 and for many people sex that 
is artful and controlled is intimate sex.210 “Our culture is all too 
ready to think that sex involves no skill and is simply ‘natu-
ral,’” Martha Nussbaum writes. Such a view is “surely false and 
is not even seriously entertained by many cultures,”211 she con-
tinues. 
In addition, for many couples trying to sexually conceive 
(and particularly for those who struggle with a diagnosis of in-
fertility), sex is likely to bear many of the characteristics rou-
tinely associated with alternative reproduction: control, non-
intimacy, and artificiality.212 Such couples, according to some 
studies, frequently experience a decrease in intimacy not only 
in their sexual relations but also in their overall emotional and 
physical relationship.213 These couples often remark upon—and 
complain about—the programmed character of their sex lives, 
which, once spontaneous, become obsessively timed to accom-
 
 209. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 154, at 703 n.24 (“Certainly 
nonintimacy is involved in many noncommercial sexual relationships and is 
sometimes desired as such.”). 
 210. See generally ROBIN BAUER, QUEER BDSM INTIMACIES: CRITICAL 
CONSENT AND PUSHING BOUNDARIES (2014) (surveying the intimacies created 
by BDSM practitioners). 
 211. Nussbaum, supra note 154, at 704. 
 212. See generally Sarah Elizabeth Richards, When Sex Becomes a Chore, 
SLATE (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex_health/ 
2010/04/when_sex_becomes_a_chore.html (discussing how infertility negative-
ly impacts couples’ sex lives). 
 213. See, e.g., Andrea Mechanick Braverman, Psychosocial Aspects of Infer-
tility: Sexual Dysfunction, 1266 ADVANCES FERTILITY & REPROD. MED. 270, 
273 (2004); Leah S. Millheiser et al., Is Infertility a Risk Factor for Female 
Sexual Dysfunction? A Case-Control Study, 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2022, 
2023 (2010) (reporting findings that forty percent of patients with a diagnosis 
of infertility exhibited sexual dysfunction, compared to twenty-five percent of 
patients without such a diagnosis); Manoj Monga et al., Impact of Infertility on 
Quality of Life, Marital Adjustment, and Sexual Function, 63 UROLOGY 126 
(2004). 
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modate ovulation cycles and peak fertility days. For example, 
Professor Shultz writes that, “management of sexual relations 
according to menstrual cycle or temperature charts could turn 
an intensely personal form of communication into a purely in-
strumental activity.”214 Studies also indicate that divorce rates 
are significantly higher among those couples who fail to con-
ceive after undergoing fertility treatments.215 
These studies confirm what ought to be common wisdom, 
namely that intimacy—at least as that term is used in argu-
ments favoring alternative reproductive regulation—is not 
guaranteed for any couple that is trying to conceive, whether 
sexually or through alternative means. The fact that sexually 
conceived children are at least sometimes, if not often, created 
under conditions of apparent non-intimacy216 weakens the claim 
that sexual, unlike alternative, procreation merits privacy pro-
tection because it sits within the “protected sphere of sexually 
intimate conduct.”217 The same characteristic so often invoked 
to justify why alternative reproduction can be regulated—non-
intimacy—can just as easily apply to sexual procreation. 
On this point, consider Steven S. v. Deborah D, which 
found that a donor was not a father because conception oc-
curred “artificially” and with physician assistance.218 There, a 
man who helped a woman become pregnant and eventually give 
birth to a son sued her to establish paternity over the child. 
Steven and Deborah first attempted to conceive “artificially” 
with physician assistance, which is required under California 
law for a man to avoid paternity.219 Following a miscarriage and 
 
 214. Shultz, supra note 200, at 304–05. 
 215. Shannon Firth, Study: Infertile Couples 3 Times More Likely To Di-
vorce, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/ 
01/31/study-infertile-couples-3-times-more-likely-to-divorce. 
 216. To be clear, this Article is not suggesting that deliberately procreative 
sex is invariably non-intimate. Rather, it is simply recognizing that procrea-
tive sex might (and often does) bear the very characteristics—control, deliber-
ation, and forethought—that commentators use to distinguish between “inti-
mate” procreative sex and “non-intimate” alternative reproduction. For the 
view that planned sexual reproduction can sometimes increase intimacy in a 
relationship, see KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHER-
HOOD, 166–68, 210–13 (1984). 
 217. Cahn, Do Tell!, supra note 9 at 1106 (emphasis added). 
 218. 127 Cal. App. 4th 319 (2005). 
 219. See id. at 326 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b)(2)). Under California’s 
donor insemination statutes, donors who use physician assistance can still be-
come fathers if they contract into paternity prior to conception, just as donors 
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several subsequent attempts—all unsuccessful—to conceive 
with “third-party” assistance, Steven and Deborah started to 
engage in “sexual intercourse in an attempt to impregnate 
Deborah.”220 No more successful conceiving sexually, however, 
Deborah again turned to “third-party” assistance by attempting 
to conceive through “artificial” insemination with Steven’s se-
men.221 Deborah eventually became pregnant and gave birth to 
a baby boy. Shortly thereafter, Steven sued for paternal 
rights,222 but lost because of the manner in which conception oc-
curred: “artificially” rather than sexually, and with physician 
assistance.223 
Most relevant here is the Steven S. court’s descriptions of 
alternative and sexual reproduction as each occurred between 
Steven and Deborah. The court describes the parties’ act of al-
ternative conception in language suggestive of intimacy: “[Ste-
ven] accompanied [Deborah] to the insemination with [Ste-
ven’s] sperm and held her hand during the procedure.”224 By 
contrast, it recounts their sexual insemination in mechanistic 
terms suggestive of “artificial” reproduction: “[A]fter the initial 
impregnation failed,” the court writes, “the parties engaged in 
sexual intercourse in an attempt to impregnate Deborah.”225 
Steven S. unsettles unexamined assumptions regarding the 
intrinsic nature of sexual and alternative reproduction—
assumptions that presume a certain kind of intimacy in one 
setting but not in the other. As with the vignettes with which 
this Article began, sometimes “artificial” reproduction involves 
a human touch—literally, in the case of Steven S. And some-
times sexual reproduction is “purely instrumental,”226 a form of 
sexual congress that is no less artful—and perhaps even more 
so—than “artificial” reproduction. 
 
who do not use physician assistance can avoid paternity if they contract out of 
it prior to conception. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7613(b)(2)(A), (C). 
 220. Steven S., 127 Cal. App. 4th at 324. 
 221. Id. at 323. 
 222. See id. 
 223. Id. at 327–28. 
 224. Id. at 323 (emphasis added). 
 225. Id. at 324. 
 226. Shultz, supra note 200, at 304–05. 
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2. Intimate and Unplanned Alternative Reproduction 
a. Intimate Alternative Reproduction 
Intimacy characterizes alternative reproduction as often as 
it does sexual reproduction. As for examples of “intimate” al-
ternative reproduction from the donee’s point of view, the pro-
cess of finding (and choosing) a donor (or reproductive partner) 
is an intimate act that has been analogized to the process of 
finding a romantic partner.227 One of the women who conceived 
children with the semen of Trent Arsenault argued that she be-
came “sexually intimate” with Mr. Arsenault in the process of 
getting to know him, even though she did not have sexual in-
tercourse with him.228 Similarly, individuals who access the so-
cial networks that unite people who desire to reproduce and co-
parent together outside of a traditional intimate relation-
ship229—networks like PollenTree.com, Coparents.com, Co-
ParentMatch.com, MyAlternativeFamily.com, and Modamily-
.com230—describe the process of finding a co-parent in terms 
reminiscent of romance. “[J]ust like in any relationship,” one 
user of these networks remarks, “‘there needed to be a spark’”231 
 
 227. See, e.g., Steve Dilbeck, Sperm Donors Wanted, Only High-Caliber 
Jocks Need Apply, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.dailynews 
.com/article/ZZ/20080826/NEWS/808269908 (summarizing the remarks of the 
California Cryobank’s founder that “any single woman who is out dating for a 
husband, or looking for a genetic source for her child, does the same thing” as 
a woman looking for a sperm donor). 
 228. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, 
Doe v. FDA, No. C12–03412(EMC) (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2013) http:// 
causeofaction.org/assets/uploads/2013/01/ECF-No-33_First-Amended 
-Complaint.pdf. (“Prior to their first act of conception, Mr. Arsenault and Ms. 
Doe formed an intimate bond and close friendship over the course of numerous 
conversations. Mr. Arsenault revealed many intimate, personal details of his 
life to Ms. Doe and discussed with Ms. Doe his medical history, his health, and 
his views on the role of a father who helps a woman in a same-sex relationship 
conceive a child and start a family with her partner.” (emphasis added)); see 
also Abbasi, supra note 85, at 38 (“[S]exually intimate relationships can in-
volve a broad range of physical and emotional intimacies, only some of which 
are contained within the [sexually intimate partner] definition advanced by 
the FDA.”). 
 229. See Alana Semuels, Sperm Donor, Life Partner, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 8, 
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/sperm-donor-life 
-partner/383421. 
 230. Indeed, these co-parenting networks mimic romantic sexual networks, 
like Match.com, in the language that they use (“match”) to describe the pro-
cess of finding a reproductive partner. 
 231. Abby Ellin, Making a Child, Minus the Couple, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/fashion/seeking-to-reproduce 
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between him and his parenting mate. He describes his relation-
ship with the woman with whom he chose to reproduce and 
parent as one where “electricity was palpable from the start.”232 
Intimacy marks not just the donee’s search for a reproduc-
tive partner, but also her receipt of another person’s gametes.233 
Whether through alternative insemination or in vitro fertiliza-
tion, receiving the gametes of another person into the body is a 
profoundly intimate act that involves the joining of bodies—not 
unlike sex, in fact, save for the body parts that are being 
joined.234 
Finally, alternative reproduction might involve emotionally 
and physically intimate relations between the donee and her 
doctor or sexual interactions between the donee and her part-
ner, if any. Romantic partners of the donee often help the doc-
tor administer the syringe, which, recall, was a way for married 
couples to naturalize alternative insemination during the rela-
tively early days of its use.235 Others inseminate the donee at 
home with either a syringe, a turkey baster—the same turkey 
baster that effectively converts assisted conception into sexual 
conception in Virginia—or a device like the Semenette, which, 
as described by its creator, is a “novelty sex toy with specifically 
designed inner tubing embedded inside with an attached pump 
intended for people to be able to mimic intercourse and ejacula-
tion.”236 The Semenette’s inventor, Stephanie Berman, has re-
marked that she wanted to design a sex toy that doubled as an 
insemination device in order to conceive a child with her wife in 
a way that would allow her to “feel[] connected and involved” 
 
-without-a-romantic-partnership.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&. 
 232. Id. 
 233. This Article uses the pronoun “her” to describe most recipients of al-
ternative insemination, but recognizes that some recipients are transgender 
men. See generally Laura Nixon, The Right To (Trans)Parent: A Reproductive 
Justice Approach to Reproductive Rights, Fertility, and Family-Building Issues 
Facing Transgender People, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73 (2014) (explor-
ing ways to include transgender people in the discussion about reproductive 
rights). 
 234. See also Matsumura, supra note 162, at 162 n.18 (using the term “in-
timate” to describe “agreements dealing with matters typically associated with 
intimacy, like sexual reproduction, even if they are made between people at 
arms’ length, e.g., surrogacy contracts”). 
 235. See Bernstein, supra note 180, at 1049–50. 
 236. Kira Brekke, Introducing the Semenette, a New Sex Toy that Aims To 
Help Lesbian Couples Conceive a Baby, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/28/sex-toy-lesbians-baby_n_6957758 
.html. 
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and “to really feel like [she] had [a] bond in conceiving [her] 
daughter.”237 As a recent Slate piece reports, lesbian couples 
like Berman and her partner are increasingly opting for these 
more “intimate” and “romantic” do-it-yourself inseminations.238 
As for examples of “intimate” alternative insemination 
from the donor’s point of view, sperm donors may very well ex-
perience intimacy upon donating semen—despite the FDA’s as-
sumption that sperm donation is not an “intimate” activity,239 
even when it occurs within the privacy of one’s home. Donors 
engage in intimate self-expression when reading the pornogra-
phy supplied by sperm banks and using it to create semen 
through masturbation.240 This is the same pornography, it bears 
mention, that receives constitutional protection in part because 
it “satisf[ies] intellectual and emotional needs,” according to the 
Supreme Court.241  
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Jillian Keenan, Beyond the Turkey Baster, SLATE (Aug. 26, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/08/intrauterine_ 
insemination_at_home_midwives_are_performing_iuis_without_formal.html. 
 239. See supra notes 85, 88 and accompanying text (discussing the FDA’s 
refusal to grant non-sexual sperm donations between non-anonymous partners 
the mandatory testing exemption that it grants to “sexually intimate partners” 
under 21 C.F.R. Part 1271). 
 240. It is also worth noting that for some donors the donation process in-
volves warmth, fun, intimacy, and human connection—making it look less like 
the transactional process sometimes conjured by those who describe gamete 
donation in purely commercial and institutionalized terms. Some male donors, 
for instance, gain pleasure from their work, as shown by sociologist Rene 
Almeling in her observational study of gamete providers and consumers. RENE 
ALMELING, SEX CELLS: THE MEDICAL MARKET FOR EGGS AND SPERM 105 
(2011). Demystifying an industry that is often conceptualized in purely “artifi-
cial” terms, Almeling reveals that at least one third of the sperm donors whom 
she interviewed said that “donation was pleasurable or fun, as it entailed an 
approved moment of looking at pornography and having an orgasm.” Id. 
Almeling’s work on egg donation similarly debunks common images of that 
practice as painful and unpleasant. See id. at 108 (stating that “egg donors de-
scribe the injections and egg retrieval in much less onerous terms than do in-
fertile women because being paid thousands of dollars and not trying to be-
come pregnant results in a different embodied experience of IVF”). Indeed, 
Almeling’s research on the “embodied experience” of gamete donation chal-
lenges the dominant conception of alternative reproduction as a world popu-
lated by corporate brokers and their arm’s length transactions. See id. at 8 
(arguing that gamete donors’ physical experience of gamete donation is shaped 
by factors independent of the actual physical donation process); Rene Almeling 
& Iris Willey, Same Medicine, Different Reasons: Comparing Women’s Bodily 
Experience of Producing Eggs for Pregnancy or for Profit (2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (testing and reporting results confirming the 
“embodiment” phenomenon in the context of egg donation). 
 241. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
  
2016] REPRODUCTION RECONCEIVED 665 
 
These examples of “intimate” alternative reproduction from 
both the donee and the donor’s point of view suggest that alter-
native reproduction is as intimate as sexual reproduction from 
a qualitative as well as a quantitative perspective. In fact, in 
many cases there might even be more intimacy “to go around,” 
so to speak, in the alternative reproductive context than in the 
sexual reproductive context. The intimacy of alternative repro-
duction travels along multiple pathways and diverse distribu-
tional channels, uniting donor, donee, romantic partner, doctor, 
and sperm bank personnel, among others. Even if face-to-face 
“interface” does not exist between donor and donee, and even if 
the “interface” between donor and donee implicates com-
merce,242 meaningful connection often does exist between and 
among all of the players involved in this distributional web. 
Some scholars assume that “meaningful interface” is absent in 
alternative reproduction—thereby rendering it susceptible to 
the state’s regulatory ambition,243 but also more reliable from a 
contractual perspective244—because it does not involve certain 
body parts uniting with others in a single moment of hetero-
sexual coitus or because it involves multiple players engaged in 
presumptively commercial activity. That assumption, however, 
privileges a narrow and dyadic conception of human intimacy 
over the more expansive and polyadic forms of connection and 
human flourishing that alternative reproduction often makes 
possible.245 
 
 242. For a view challenging the dominant conception of commercial con-
tracts as unnatural (and therefore presumptively non-intimate), see Martha 
M. Ertman, Private Ordering Under the ALI Principles: As Natural as Status, 
in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 284, 285–86 (Mary 
Ann Glendon & Robin Wilson eds., 2006). 
 243. See, e.g., Fox, Racial Classification, supra note 103, at 1883. 
 244. Shultz, supra note 200, at 324 (“[T]he time, effort, emotion and money 
expended; and the involvement of non-intimates . . . mean that the intentions 
of those involved [in alternative reproduction] are more likely to be delibera-
tive, explicit and bargained-for than is[ ] the case in most situations of ordi-
nary coital reproduction.”). 
 245. Adrienne Davis makes a similar point with respect to opposition to 
polygamy, part of which, she argues, derives from a discomfort with “multiple 
players” in a marital or relational context. See Davis, supra note 12, at 2037 
(“Essentialist claims that dyadicism is ‘good’ and polyfidelity is ‘bad’ natural-
izes dyadic marriage as a static institution with an intrinsic set of ‘idealized’ 
traits, obscuring it as a product of political and legal struggle and reform”); see 
also Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 353 (2000) (arguing that opposition to bisexuality stems, in part, from a 
discomfort with the “excess” or “surfeit” that it represents). 
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Indeed, even the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized 
that intimacy often exists in clinical settings like the doctor’s 
office. “[T]he constitutionally protected privacy of family, mar-
riage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing,” the Paris 
Adult Theatre v. Slaton Court observed, “is not just concerned 
with a particular place, but with a protected intimate relation-
ship.”246 “Such protected privacy,” the Court continued, “extends 
to the doctor’s office, the hospital, the hotel room, or as other-
wise required to safeguard the right to intimacy involved.”247 As 
far back as 1973, then, when Paris Adult Theatre was decided, 
the Court recognized that intimacy—including procreative in-
timacy—was a capacious concept that applied to certain rela-
tionships and places (doctor/patient, doctor’s office) no less than 
it did to others (sexual partners, bedroom).248 
b. Unplanned Alternative Reproduction 
Just as it can be intimate, alternative reproduction can al-
so be unplanned—another attribute typically associated only 
with sexual procreation, even if the reality behind it, as Subsec-
tion 1 showed, often suggests otherwise. The dominant concep-
tion of alternative reproduction is one of control, planning, and 
deliberation. Objections to alternative reproduction for trying 
to replace the randomness of sexual procreation with eugenic 
perfection rest on this conception,249 as did laws that excluded 
same-sex couples from marriage for being “too good” at procrea-
tion.250 
 
 246. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973). 
 247. Id. 
 248. As the Paris Adult Theatre Court observed, the Supreme Court had 
already implicitly recognized in Roe v. Wade, decided just five months before 
Paris Adult Theatre, that the Constitution protects procreative intimacy be-
tween doctor and patient no less than it protects procreative intimacy between 
married persons. Id. at 66 n.13 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), for 
the proposition that constitutional privacy “extends to the doctor’s office”). 
 249. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION 45 
(2007) (arguing against “bioengineering and genetic enhancement” in part be-
cause “we do not choose our children. Their qualities are unpredictable, and 
even the most conscientious parents cannot be held wholly responsible for the 
kind of child they have”); Fox, Racial Classification, supra note 103, at 1884 
(arguing that the law ought to discourage gamete banks from making race sa-
lient in donor selection in part because “it seems unfitting for the affective ties 
parents have for their future child to be conditional on the child’s being born 
with whatever qualities—ingenuity, athleticism, or their own racial features—
parents happen to prefer”). 
 250. Kenji Yoshino, Too Good for Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/14/opinion/14yoshino.html?_r=0 (discussing 
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More specifically, starting in the 2000s, several courts 
started to uphold laws prohibiting same-sex marriage by ad-
verting to states’ legitimate interest in “responsible procrea-
tion.” The responsible procreation rationale theorized that 
same-sex couples did not need marriage because their procrea-
tion, if any, was planned and predictable—unlike the procrea-
tion of opposite-sex couples, which, on this view, was often un-
planned and chaotic.251 In one court’s words: “[Alternative 
reproduction] require[s] a great deal of foresight and planning. 
‘Natural’ procreation, on the other hand, may occur . . . with no 
foresight or planning.”252 This justification for exclusionary 
marriage laws conceptualized heterosexual procreation as an 
(often) “accidental” consequence of sex and marriage as the 
normatively necessary institutional response to that accident. 
On this telling, same-sex couples did not need marriage be-
cause their procreation was never accidental, always planned. 
Even as it undercut the stereotype of sexual minorities as 
dissolute sexual actors,253 the responsible procreation argument 
perpetuated the stereotype of gays and lesbians as a moneyed 
class for whom legal protections, like marriage, were unneces-
sary.254 It also perpetuated another misconception: that alterna-
tive reproduction was deliberate and planned in ways that dis-
tinguished it from chaotic and unplanned sexual procreation. 
This misconception was particularly injurious, as it constituted 
the primary justificatory basis for many states’ exclusionary 
marriage laws for years. 
The responsible procreation rationale was only half right. 
It captured the reality that same-sex couples “plan” to have a 
child when undertaking alternative reproduction, unlike oppo-
site-sex couples, whose sex sometimes results in “unplanned” 
pregnancies. It failed to capture, however, the reality that 
same-sex couples do not necessarily “plan” for all of the conse-
quences of that reproduction. As with sex, unpredictable events 
 
and critiquing the “responsible procreation” rationale for exclusionary mar-
riage laws). 
 251. See infra note 298 and accompanying text. 
 252. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
 253. See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage, Biology, and Gender, 98 IOWA L. 
REV. BULL. 83, 89 (2013); Julie A. Nice, The Descent of Responsible Procrea-
tion: A Genealogy of an Ideology, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 781, 789–90 (2012). 
 254. On this stereotype and its role in shoring up the responsible procrea-
tion rationale, see Courtney Megan Cahill, The Genuine Article: A Subversive 
Economic Perspective on the Law’s Procreationist Vision of Marriage, 64 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 393, 443–44 (2007) [hereinafter Cahill, The Genuine Article]. 
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might follow from alternative reproduction. A woman might be 
alternatively inseminated with semen from a donor other than 
the one whom she chose; a “mix-up” of this kind was the subject 
of a recent (unsuccessful) lawsuit against a sperm bank in Illi-
nois.255 Or, a donor who is not screened by a bank for a particu-
lar genetic condition might transmit that condition to a child, 
which has happened in some cases.256 While alternative repro-
duction might involve “a great deal of foresight and plan-
ning,”257 no reproduction is perfect, and mistakes or “accidents” 
can result from alternative reproduction just as they can result 
from sex. 
The responsible procreation rationale and the “planned”/ 
“unplanned” reproductive binary on which it rested has faded 
into oblivion, rejected by courts, including the Supreme Court, 
as incorrect, farcical even.258 But its erroneous assumptions 
about sexual and alternative reproduction persist in the law’s 
dual system of reproductive regulation. Paradigms of “nature” 
and “artifice” continue to influence—and distort—legal under-
standings of sexual and alternative reproduction, even as the 
lived experience of those who engage in those methods of life 
creation suggests a more complicated picture. 
B. PERFECT IDENTITY BETWEEN SEXUAL AND ALTERNATIVE 
REPRODUCTION  
Sometimes, sexual and alternative reproduction share sim-
ilar traits: intimacy and non-intimacy, planning and chance. 
Other times, sexual and alternative reproduction are exactly 
the same thing. Consider the growing practice of “one-night 
 
 255. Abby Phillip, White Woman Accidentally Inseminated with Black 
Man’s Sperm Loses Legal Battle, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2015), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/05/white-woman 
-accidentally-impregnated-with-black-mans-sperm-loses-legal-battle (discuss-
ing the story of Jennifer Cramblett, who lost her wrongful birth lawsuit 
against the sperm bank that mistakenly gave her fertility specialist sperm 
from the wrong donor). 
 256. Denise Grady, As the Use of Donor Sperm Increases, Secrecy Can Be a 
Health Hazard, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/ 
06/health/06opin.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (discussing the story of an anon-
ymous donor who “passed a serious gene defect to five” of the children con-
ceived from his sperm). 
 257. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24. 
 258. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 662 (7th Cir. 2014) (dismissing the 
responsible procreation rationale as completely nonsensical). The demise of 
the responsible procreation rationale is discussed at greater length infra Part 
IV.B. 
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stand” or “natural” inseminations, where a man donates his 
sperm by sexually inseminating a woman for free.259 Natural 
insemination is an attractive procreative option for some wom-
en because it provides them with the opportunity to avoid 
third-party brokers, like sperm banks and fertility providers, 
which might discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, 
marital status, or both;260 it also allows them to use fresh se-
men, which some believe maximizes the chances for concep-
tion.261 In at least one jurisdiction, Québec, Canada, natural in-
semination is a formally recognized method of alternative 
conception. Under the Québec law, a man can donate sperm 
sexually to a woman and remain a “donor.”262 While no Ameri-
can jurisdiction recognizes a similar category of “artificial in-
semination by intercourse,” as Part I revealed, some scholars 
have expressed varying degrees of support for it.263 
The men and women who enter into natural insemination 
agreements regard the sexual aspect of the donation as irrele-
vant to the legal status of the child that results from it. Unlike 
courts, which maintain strict legal distinctions between sexual 
 
 259. For media coverage of this phenomenon, see Elizabeth Picciuto, Have 
Sperm, Will Travel: The ‘Natural Inseminators’ Helping Women Avoid the 
Sperm Bank, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 29, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
articles/2014/11/29/have-sperm-will-travel-the-natural-inseminators-helping 
-women-avoid-the-sperm-bank.html; Jeff Schneider, Muriel Pearson, & Alexa 
Valiente, Meet the Men Having Sex with Strangers To Help Them Have Babies, 
ABC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/Lifestyle/meet-men-sex 
-strangers-babies/story?id=26870643. 
 260. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Sup. Ct., 189 
P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (finding that the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution did not bar a woman’s lawsuit against her fertility provider for 
discriminating against her on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of a 
state public accommodations statute); Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive 
Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. 
& JUST. 18, 45 (2008) (discussing legislative proposals to restrict alternative 
reproductive technologies to certain groups like married women but observing 
that such proposals have so far failed to garner enough support). 
 261. See Picciuto, supra note 259. 
 262. Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, art 538.2 (Can.). The law, how-
ever, allows the man to establish paternity within one year of the child’s birth. 
See id. Should this occur, the man “will displace the biological mother’s part-
ner”—if any—“as the child’s other legal parent.” Nicholas Bala & Christine 
Ashbourne, The Widening Concept of “Parent” in Canada: Step-Parents, Same-
Sex Partners, & Parents by ART, 20 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 525, 542 
(2012). 
 263. See Appleton, supra note 50, at 111 (suggesting that the law might 
consider this practice); Polikoff, supra note 126, at 59 (supporting this prac-
tice). 
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and alternative insemination,264 the parties to natural insemi-
nation agreements prefer instead to conceptualize sex as mere-
ly one among many legally equivalent life-creating mecha-
nisms. In this sense, natural insemination throws into relief 
the volatility of a binary that was never completely stable to 
begin with but that has grown even less so over time. 
C. SUMMARY 
Different treatment of sexual and alternative reproduction 
is predicated on an incoherent factual assumption: that sexual 
and alternative reproduction are different in fact, therefore 
meriting different treatment in law. As this Part has shown, 
rather than assuming that sexual and alternative reproduction 
occupy the “extreme” ends of a single reproductive continuum, 
as the Ferguson v. McKiernan court suggested,265 it is more ac-
curate to say that sexual and alternative reproduction exist on 
their own continuum, one which is defined by “natural” and 
“artificial” extremes. For instance, sexual reproduction can be 
natural, uncontrolled, and unpredictable, or it can be artful, 
controlled, and planned. Similarly, alternative reproduction can 
bear the presumed hallmarks of natural sex—uncontrolled and 
intimate—or it can be more artful and controlled. Remapping 
the law’s reproductive binary in this way illuminates the quali-
tative similarities between sexual and alternative reproduction 
and complicates the law’s dual system of procreative regula-
tion. It shows that the factors on which the law relies to justify 
a dual system of reproductive regulation—intimacy, familiari-
ty, sex, deliberation, control, predictability, and naturalness—
could just as easily describe one form of procreation as another. 
In addition, remapping the binary in this way not only re-
veals the many similarities between, and in some cases perfect 
overlap of, sexual and alternative reproduction; it also suggests 
the deficiencies of basing reproductive regulation on factors—
like intimacy—that are vague, imprecise, and easily susceptible 
to conflicting applications. For instance, under California law 
Mr. Arsenault is a father because he did not use a doctor in the 
insemination process; as such, his procreative activity was in-
timate in a way that excluded it from the class of procreative 
 
 264. See supra notes 42, 43, 51, 252, and accompanying text. 
 265. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1246 (Pa. 2007) (describing 
sexual and alternative reproduction as two “extremes” on a reproductive con-
tinuum). 
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acts protected by California’s alternative insemination statute. 
Under federal law, however, Mr. Arsenault is a de facto sperm 
bank because his relationships with his procreative donees 
were not intimate enough for him to receive the FDA testing 
exemption for sexually intimate partners. If under state law 
Mr. Arsenault’s acts were too intimate, under federal law they 
were insufficiently so. Intimacy, it appears, simply cannot do 
the work that it must to sustain the sex/non-sex binary because 
no one can reliably define what intimacy does and does not 
mean. 
IV.  CHALLENGING THE BINARY: CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEFICIENCIES   
Even if sexual and alternative reproduction were formally 
distinct, and even if the law’s sex/non-sex binary were not pred-
icated on vague and imprecise factors like intimacy, that binary 
would still raise concern as a matter of constitutional law. The 
Supreme Court’s landmark marriage equality decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges266 suggests that alternative reproduction is 
a fundamental right, thereby challenging those who argue that 
the state can regulate alternative reproduction because it lacks 
robust constitutional protection. In addition, the Court’s exist-
ing and emerging jurisprudence on sexual privacy and family 
formation suggests that procreation is constitutionally signifi-
cant not because of how it occurs—sexually or alternatively—
but rather because of what it effectuates: family formation and 
intentional parenthood. As such, that jurisprudence calls into 
question the sex/non-sex binary and sex exceptionalism more 
generally; it also casts doubt on the law’s privileging of form 
over intent, and of one form of intimacy over another, in repro-
ductive matters. 
A. ALTERNATIVE REPRODUCTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
Many, if not most, of the proposed regulations of alterna-
tive reproduction discussed in Part I rest either explicitly or 
implicitly on the “premise” that “reproduction through [repro-
ductive] technologies is a ‘lower status’ kind of reproduction, 
worthy of less protection.”267 Obergefell destabilizes that prem-
 
 266. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 267. Cohen, supra note 125, at 445; see also Mary Patricia Byrn & Rebecca 
Ireland, Anonymously Provided Sperm and the Constitution, 23 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 1, 20 (2012). 
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ise not only by suggesting that procreation is a fundamental 
right—as opposed to a more modest equality right—but also by 
laying the foundation for protecting alternative reproduction 
under that right. 
The Constitution makes no reference to a procreative right, 
let alone to a sexually procreative right. Constitutional text 
alone, then, does not mandate different treatment of sexual and 
alternative conception; nor does that text contemplate the 
privileged status often assigned to the former in contemporary 
discussions about alternative reproductive regulation. 
In addition, neither the history surrounding, nor the text 
of, the case that purportedly established the fundamental right 
to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma,268 supports the argument 
that only sexual procreation receives fundamental right status. 
Skinner nowhere mentions sexual procreation specifically; in-
stead, it refers to procreation in more general terms, stating: 
“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very exist-
ence and survival of the race.”269 Furthermore, when Skinner 
acknowledged the constitutional importance of procreation in 
1942, alternative insemination was not just available but also 
used on a “widescale basis.”270 
Finally, Supreme Court doctrine nowhere suggests that 
procreation merits constitutional protection only if it results 
from sexual intercourse.271 
 
 268. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down Oklahoma’s mandatory steriliza-
tion law under the federal Equal Protection Clause). For the view that Skinner 
established a fundamental right to procreate under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, see Wu, supra note 124, at 1475 (“The strongest precedent for establish-
ing a fundamental right to procreate is Skinner.”). Not all scholars endorse 
that view; they instead argue that Skinner at most establishes a more modest 
equality right in procreative matters. See infra notes 272, 285, and accompa-
nying text. 
 269. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. For the view that Skinner forged a right to 
procreate in the shadow of sexual procreation specifically, see Ariela R. 
Dubler, Sexing Skinner: History and the Politics of the Right To Marry, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1359 (2010) (reading Skinner not just as a case about 
the dangers of totalitarianism and forced sterilization, but also “as a case 
about the larger phenomenon of disentangling sex from reproduction and the 
social anxieties raised by that separation”). 
 270. John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a “Parent”?: The Claims 
of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 353 (1991). 
 271. The Supreme Court has never applied Skinner to a case about alter-
native reproduction, nor has it ever had the occasion to do so. See id. at 367. 
As Dubler shows, Skinner “languished in relative obscurity” for decades after 
it was decided. Dubler, supra note 269, at 1370. When it was finally cited—
first by Justice Harlan in his 1961 Poe v. Ullman dissent, 367 U.S. 497, 543 
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To the contrary, the Court’s recent decision in Obergefell 
indicates that the Constitution protects not just procreation but 
alternative procreation specifically as a fundamental right. 
Obergefell provides critical guidance on two procreation-specific 
questions that have remained unanswered since Skinner. The 
first is whether procreation is a fundamental right under the 
Due Process Clause or a more limited equality right. The se-
cond is whether the constitutional right to procreate includes 
the right to reproduce through alternative means. 
As for the first issue, Obergefell suggests that procreation 
is a fundamental liberty right rather than a more modest 
equality right, as some scholars who support alternative repro-
ductive regulation have argued.272 As it does with the right to 
marry, which before Obergefell was grounded in equality rather 
than exclusively in liberty,273 Obergefell discusses procreation in 
 
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), and four years later by Justice Douglas, Skin-
ner ’s author, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)—it was sub-
tly transformed from a case about (marital) procreation into one about marital 
privacy and the importance of extending constitutional protection to spouses’ 
decisions not to reproduce. By 1967, when the Court cited Skinner in support 
of a constitutional right to marry in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), 
“Skinner ’s transformation into a due process case about the right to marry 
was complete.” Dubler, supra note 269, at 1373; see also Hill, supra note 270, 
at 366 (“[Skinner] has been incorporated unofficially into substantive due pro-
cess analysis as part of the privacy right elaborated years later in Griswold v. 
Connecticut and its progeny.”). 
 272. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 134, at 1475 (arguing that Skinner does not 
“embod[y] a fundamental right to reproductive autonomy” and that its “equal 
protection language is no accident; to the contrary, it reveals the Supreme 
Court’s longstanding concern for reproductive equality”); Goodwin, supra note 
107, at 1089 (arguing that Skinner “says little about the importance or value 
of reproduction or the right to reproduce”). Not all scholars agree with these 
more constrained readings of Skinner. See Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, 
supra note 122, at 1493 (arguing that “[a]lthough [Skinner] couched its deci-
sion in the language of equality . . . the rhetoric of a liberty right to reproduce 
. . . explains the frequency with which the case is now cited”); Ira C. Lupu, Un-
tangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 
1019 (1979). 
 273. Prior right to marry cases, including Loving v. Virginia and Zablocki 
v. Redhail, either interwove equality and liberty or rested exclusively on the 
Equal Protection Clause, leading some commentators to suggest that those 
cases at most established that the Constitution guarantees “equal access” to 
marriage, not that marriage is a fundamental right. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe & 
Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right To Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
1375 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right To Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 
2083 (2005) (suggesting that the state could abolish marriage without violat-
ing due process). Obergefell, by contrast, is a persistent meditation on the 
marriage “right.” Even as it clearly observes the equality dimension of mar-
riage, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603–05 (2015), Obergefell in-
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fundamental rights terms. “[I]n Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson,” the majority states, “the Court invalidated under 
both principles [liberty and equality] a law that allowed sterili-
zation of habitual criminals.”274 Like the marriage right, the 
procreative right derives from the “independent principles” that 
animate due process and equal protection.275 Moreover, like the 
marriage right, the procreative right involves “both” liberty 
“and” equality.276 Given that Obergefell refers to marriage and 
procreation as “related rights” that compose a “unified 
whole,”277 it is not implausible to conclude that Obergefell pro-
vides an opening for what some scholars see lacking in Skinner: 
a robust articulation of procreation’s substantive constitutional 
dimension.278 
If that is correct, then Obergefell unsettles arguments in 
favor of alternative reproductive regulation that flow from re-
productive binarism—specifically, arguments that assume that 
Skinner protects, if anything, a more constrained equality right 
in procreative decision-making rather than a more expansive 
liberty right to reproduce.279 In a world where procreation is not 
 
sists that “[t]he Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause . . . set 
forth independent principles,” id. at 2603 (emphasis added), and that “[t]he 
right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the 
Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of 
the equal protection of the laws,” id. at 2602 (emphasis added). The majority’s 
use of the adverbial “too” suggests that marriage is protected as a matter of 
substantive due process as well as equal protection. For a discussion of 
Obergefell’s conceptualization of marriage in pure liberty terms, see Kenji 
Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
147, 168 (2015). 
 274. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (emphasis added). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 2600. 
 278. In this sense, Obergefell conceptualizes procreation in terms reminis-
cent of Meyer v. Nebraska, a pre-Skinner case that similarly described behav-
ior related to procreation—raising a family—in terms of liberty rather than of 
equality. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that the 
term “liberty” under the Fourteenth Amendment “denotes not merely freedom 
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, . . . to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . .”). Obergefell also concep-
tualizes procreation in terms reminiscent of Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, a 
post-Skinner case that described procreation specifically in terms of liberty. 
See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (stating that the 
“right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . encompasses 
and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, moth-
erhood, procreation, and child rearing” (emphasis added)). 
 279. See supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text. 
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protected under substantive due process, reproductive regula-
tion that burdens all alternative procreators is of little constitu-
tional moment. But in a world where procreation is a funda-
mental right, reproductive regulation that burdens any 
alternative procreator raises serious constitutional concern. 
As for the second issue, Obergefell establishes a strong ba-
sis for arguing that the Constitution protects alternative repro-
duction no less vigorously than it does sexual reproduction.280 
Obergefell states that non-traditional practices, like same-sex 
marriage, may qualify for fundamental right status under the 
Due Process Clause, notwithstanding the Court’s earlier insist-
ence in Washington v. Glucksberg that “the Due Process Clause 
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which 
are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tra-
dition.’”281 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion openly rejects 
Glucksberg’s approach with respect to some fundamental 
rights, including those relating to “marriage and intimacy,” and 
refuses to define rights “by who exercised them in the past.”282 
“[R]ights come not from ancient sources alone,” the majority 
avers. “They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of 
how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains 
urgent in our own era.”283 
In rejecting the traditional approach to determining rights 
like marriage, Obergefell lays the foundation for establishing 
 
 280. To be sure, the Supreme Court arguably laid the groundwork for con-
ceptualizing alternative procreation as a fundamental liberty right in Paris 
Adult Theatre v. Slaton, where the Court not only recognized that the right to 
privacy protected procreation, but also suggested that privacy (and therefore, 
by implication, procreation) did not depend on any particular, localized con-
ception of intimacy in order to receive robust constitutional protection. See 
Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 66 n.13 (stating that “the constitutionally 
protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rear-
ing is not just concerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate 
relationship” and that “[s]uch protected privacy extends to the doctor’s office, 
the hospital, the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to 
intimacy involved”). The Supreme Court thus provided support even before 
Obergefell for the proposition that the Constitution protects (alternative) pro-
creative relations between doctor and patient no less robustly than it protects 
(sexually) procreative relations between spouses or unmarried sexual part-
ners. 
 281. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (quoting 
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (plurality opinion)). 
 282. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 283. Id.; see also Yoshino, supra note 273, at 162 (stating that “[a]fter 
Obergefell, it will be much harder to invoke Glucksberg as binding precedent” 
on the question of history’s role in determining fundamental rights). 
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constitutional parity between (traditional) sexual reproduction 
and (non-traditional) alternative reproduction. If marriage and 
procreation are “related rights,” as Obergefell says,284 and if the 
traditional approach for determining rights under the Due Pro-
cess Clause does not apply to marriage, then it follows that the 
traditional approach for determining rights probably does not 
apply to procreation, either.285 If that is correct, then Obergefell 
complicates reproductive regulation that flows from a belief 
that alternative procreation is different from—and constitu-
tionally inferior to—that of the conventional sexual variety. 
B. THE DEVOLUTION OF SEX EXCEPTIONALISM 
Much of the actual and proposed reproductive regulation 
considered in Part I reflects a belief that sexual and alternative 
reproduction are fundamentally distinct because one involves 
sex and the other does not. Sexual and alternative reproduction 
“are, in fact, different, and different enough to satisfy any level 
of constitutional scrutiny,” Cahn writes.286 “[N]atural reproduc-
tion” and “clinical or assisted reproduction . . . are distinctly dif-
ferent,”287 Michele Goodwin asserts. 
The foundational assumption that underlies these state-
ments—that sex is unique and therefore merits different, and 
often privileged, treatment—is factually misguided, as Part IV 
demonstrated. But according to Supreme Court jurisprudence 
on sex, marriage, and procreation, it is also constitutionally de-
ficient, as that jurisprudence suggests that the constitutional 
rights to sexual autonomy, marriage, and even procreation do 
not—and cannot—turn on the question of whether one engages 
in sex, narrowly and traditionally defined. 
Consider the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which 
established a right to sexual privacy that includes same-sex 
couples.288 Lawrence found that criminal sodomy laws violated a 
constitutionally protected right to non-coital, non-procreative 
conduct.289 The Court there asserts that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits the state from “defin[ing] the meaning of 
 
 284. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 285. Some scholars have suggested that Skinner does not establish a broad 
right to procreate but rather is concerned with equality. See Rao, supra note 
134, at 1475. 
 286. Cahn, Do Tell!, supra note 9, at 1106. 
 287. Goodwin, supra note 107, at 1091–92. 
 288. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 289. See id. 
  
2016] REPRODUCTION RECONCEIVED 677 
 
[a sexual] relationship or to set its boundaries”290—prohibits it, 
that is, from codifying a particular vision of sex and intimacy in 
the law.291 Where the Bowers v. Hardwick Court took offense at 
the mere suggestion that “homosexual activity” existed on the 
same constitutional plane as “family, marriage, [and] procrea-
tion,”292 Lawrence makes clear that the Constitution does not 
require sex to look a certain way—does not require that it in-
volve the union of specified body parts and specified sexes—in 
order to receive constitutional protection. It repudiates the 
Bowers Court’s requirement that sex amount to gender-specific 
coitus in order to merit fundamental right status,293 and sug-
gests that coitus was not a constitutional requirement even in 
1986: “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not 
correct today.”294 
Where Lawrence indicates that heterosexual coitus is no 
longer a necessary condition to enjoy the right to sexual auton-
omy, Obergefell indicates that heterosexual coitus is no longer a 
necessary condition to enjoy the right to marry—nor even, per-
haps, the right to procreate. Obergefell explicitly rejects sex 
exceptionalism in marriage by repudiating the procreation ra-
tionale for exclusionary marriage regimes. That rationale had 
different iterations over the years, evolving from a procreation 
as “propagation of the species” justification to the more recent 
“responsible procreation” rationale discussed earlier. Each of 
the procreation rationale’s versions, however, was driven by sex 
exceptionalism and the sex/non-sex binary foregrounded by this 
Article. When Baker v. Nelson, the first case to consider the 
constitutionality of a same-sex marriage prohibition, upheld 
that prohibition in 1971 by adverting to the procreation as 
“propagation of the species” rationale,295 and throughout the 
 
 290. Id. at 567 (emphasis added). 
 291. But see Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex in and out of 
Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 829 (2010) (arguing that “the Lawrence model 
for protecting sexual conduct is problematic not only because it channels gay 
sex into one marriage-like form, but also because it channels all sex into such 
a form”). 
 292. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 293. The Lawrence Court criticized the Bowers v. Hardwick Court’s obses-
sive focus on the mechanics of the sex act at issue there, reasoning that the 
intimate relationship, not the conduct that a relationship might entail, is the 
proper focus of a constitutional inquiry. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 294. Id. at 578. 
 295. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (rejecting a federal constitutional chal-
lenge to Minnesota’s opposite-sex marriage requirement). 
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heyday of that rationale over the next few decades,296 same-sex 
couples were “propagating the species” through alternative ra-
ther than sexual means.297 When the procreation rationale 
eventually morphed into its “responsible procreation” version, 
 
 296. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. App. 1974) 
(denying a marriage license to two men on the ground that “marriage exists as 
a protected legal institution primarily because of societal values associated 
with the propagation of the human race . . . [and] it is apparent that no same-
sex couple offers the possibility of the birth of children by their union”); 
Hatcher v. Hatcher, 580 S.W.2d 475, 483 (Ark. 1979) (observing that 
“[m]arriage is an important institution that is fundamental to our very exist-
ence and survival”); Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(observing that same-sex marriage restrictions were constitutional because 
“homosexual marriages never produce offspring”); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 
325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971). 
 297. See Bernstein, supra note 179, at 1060 (identifying a “shift in the 
1940’s [sic] to popular use” of alternative insemination). Courts and legislators 
in several states, including Minnesota, had been wrestling with issues sur-
rounding alternative insemination for years before Baker was decided, and by 
1973 the Uniform Law Commissioners had codified the trend toward legaliza-
tion of alternative insemination through the passage of the Uniform Parentage 
Act. See Bernstein, supra note 179, at 1069 n.125 (stating that “[s]everal bills 
were also introduced in Minnesota in 1949” and that these bills “would have 
made AI unlawful but would have legitimized the children”); Arthur A. 
Levisohn, Dilemma in Parenthood: Socio-Legal Aspects of Human Artificial 
Insemination, 4 J. FORENSIC MED. 147, 166 (1957). Other states considered 
similar bills around the same time. See SWANSON, supra note 192, at 216 (dis-
cussing alternative insemination bills pending in Ohio and Minnesota); George 
P. Smith, II, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the 
Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127, 143 (1968) (referring to alternative insemination 
bills pending in Indiana, New York, Virginia and Wisconsin between 1948 and 
1950). In addition, by the 1980s, as courts continued to justify same-sex mar-
riage exclusions on the ground that same-sex couples could not fulfill mar-
riage’s central goal of helping to propagate the species, commercial “sperm 
banks had become a common feature of the fertility landscape, with over 400 
clinics in operation,” Gill, supra note 24, at 1721, and the commercial gamete 
market began to cater to lesbian women in particular, with the country’s first 
lesbian-owned sperm bank, Pacific Reproductive Services, opening for busi-
ness in California in 1984. SWANSON, supra note 192, at 227 (observing a 
1970s “movement by women without male partners to take charge of their re-
production through artificial insemination”); NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1197 
(chronicling the “lesbian baby boom” of the 1980s and 1990s); Why a Lesbian-
Owned Bank Is a Positive Choice for Any Woman, PAC. REPRO. SERVS., https:// 
www.pacrepro.com/index.php?main_page=why_prs (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). 
Alternative reproduction did not emerge as an explicit theme in marriage 
equality jurisprudence until the 1995 decision Dean v. D.C., which located the 
origins of the right to marry in sexual coitus specifically when it stated: “Alt-
hough we recognize that gay and lesbian couples can and do have children 
through adoption, surrogacy, and artificial insemination . . . we cannot over-
look the fact that the Supreme Court has deemed marriage a fundamental 
right substantially because of its relationship to procreation.” 653 A.2d 307, 
333 (D.C. 1995). 
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which posited a distinction between the “accidental” procrea-
tion of “natural” procreators (for whom marriage was neces-
sary) and the “planned” procreation of “artificial” procreators 
(for whom marriage was superfluous),298 courts’ reliance on the 
sex/non-sex binary was more explicit. Either way, though, 
same-sex couples were denied the ability to marry for half a 
century because of the manner in which they procreated rather 
than because of their inability to procreate. Put differently, sex 
exceptionalism and a sex/non-sex binary justified—and drove—
exclusionary marriage regimes from the earliest days of consti-
tutional litigation surrounding them. 
Like so many of the marriage equality decisions that pre-
ceded it,299 Obergefell repudiates both sex exceptionalism and 
the sex/non-sex binary by rejecting all versions of the procrea-
tion rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions. Obergefell 
barely pauses to consider that rationale in its various incarna-
 
 298. See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. App. 2005); see also 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th. Cir. 2014) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) 
(summarizing and criticizing the responsible procreation rationale); Hernan-
dez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579, 599 (Sup. Ct. 2005), rev’d, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005), aff ’d, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Standhardt v. Superior 
Court, 77 P.3d 451, 463 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). The responsible procreation ra-
tionale had two variations. One version projected same-sex marriage in a posi-
tive light because of same-sex couples’ superior form of procreation. This was 
the version of responsible procreation that first appeared in Standhardt v. Su-
perior Court. The other version projected same-sex marriage in a negative 
light because of its putative power to disrupt and diminish social norms sur-
rounding marriage. According to it, same-sex marriage, by devaluing the in-
herent worth of traditional marriage, disincentivized opposite-sex couples to 
enter into that relationship and incentivized them instead to procreate—
irresponsibly—outside of it. For decisions that rested on this second version of 
responsible procreation, see Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1016 (D. 
Nev. 2012), rev’d sub nom., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 471 (9th Cir. 2014). 
Both versions denied same-sex couples the legal ability to marry because of 
their inability to procreate in a certain manner—through sexual rather than 
alternative means—rather than because of their inability to procreate at all. 
 299. See, e.g., Latta, 771 F.3d at 471 (rejecting all forms of the procreation 
rationale and stating that Idaho’s responsible procreation argument “runs off 
the rails” in claiming that “marriage’s stabilizing and unifying force is unnec-
essary for same-sex couples, because they always choose to conceive or adopt a 
child”); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1223 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating that 
it was “wholly illogical” to think that same-sex marriage would affect opposite-
sex couples’ procreative decision-making); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 662 
(7th Cir. 2014) (rejecting responsible procreation as non-sensical); Bostic v. 
Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 385 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting all iterations of the pro-
creation rationale); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2d Cir. 2012), 
aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 
999–1000 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff ’d sub nom., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th 
Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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tions, as if to highlight its feebleness through near disregard. 
In response to the states’ reliance on procreation as “propaga-
tion of the species,” the Court simply notes that “[a]n ability, 
desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not been a pre-
requisite for a valid marriage in any State.”300 Later, the Court 
dismisses the states’ invocation of responsible procreation—the 
fear that same-sex marriage will “lead[] to fewer opposite-sex 
marriages” because it “severs the connection between natural 
procreation and marriage”301—as both “counterintuitive” and 
“unrealistic.”302 In repudiating the procreation rationale, 
Obergefell indicates that the Constitution protects a fundamen-
tal right to marry that does not discriminate with respect to the 
mechanics of procreation. While strongly signaling that procre-
ation might require marriage as a matter of social norms,303 
Obergefell rejects the inverse of that argument, namely that 
marriage requires sexual procreation specifically as a matter of 
constitutional law. 
Where Lawrence thus rejects sex exceptionalism with re-
spect to the right to sex, Obergefell rejects it with respect to the 
right to marry. Even more, Obergefell and marriage equality 
more generally might be read to reject sex exceptionalism with 
respect to the right to procreate. As discussed earlier, 
Obergefell more than once describes marriage and procreation 
as “related rights” that compose a “unified whole.”304 If sex 
exceptionalism and the sex/non-sex binary cannot satisfy in-
fringements on the right to marry, then it follows that they 
likely cannot satisfy infringements on the “related” right to 
procreate, either. 
By establishing that heterosexual intercourse and conven-
tional understandings of intimacy are not the sine qua non of 
sexual, marital, familial, and perhaps even procreative auton-
omy, Lawrence and Obergefell destabilize the panoply of exist-
ing and proposed regimes that rely on sex exceptionalism and 
its narrow conception of sex and intimacy.305 Those regimes jus-
 
 300. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015). 
 301. Id. at 2606–07. 
 302. Id. at 2607. 
 303. Id. at 2600 (stating that the children of unmarried same-sex couples 
“suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, 
relegated through no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain fami-
ly life,” and justifying, in part, the Court’s decision to extend the marriage 
right to same-sex couples on their children’s “suffer[ing]” and “humiliation”). 
 304. Id. 
 305. For the argument that Lawrence places constitutional limits around 
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tify different treatment of sexual and alternative reproduction 
by adverting to perceived differences between “intimate” heter-
osexual reproduction and “non-intimate” alternative reproduc-
tion—differences that Lawrence and Obergefell say are irrele-
vant when determining the scope of fundamental rights 
relating to intimate and family life. In addition, those regimes 
rely on and reinforce the same sex/non-sex binary that Law-
rence and Obergefell clearly reject. 
C. FAMILIAL DISESTABLISHMENT 
The law’s sex/non-sex binary disciplines non-traditional 
family formation. As such, it conflicts with the trend away from 
sex exceptionalism in constitutional law, as the previous Sec-
tion demonstrated. It also conflicts with a cognate jurispruden-
tial trend: the trend toward familial disestablishment. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Supreme Court landmarks 
like Griswold v. Connecticut,306 Eisenstadt v. Baird,307 Roe v. 
Wade,308 and Moore v. City of East Cleveland309 disestablished 
social and familial norms privileging the traditional family, de-
fined as the sexually procreative nuclear family. More recently, 
gay rights jurisprudence has broadened the reach of the princi-
ples animating those early cases. Lawrence extended Griswold 
and Eisenstadt’s interrelated values of relational privacy and 
non-procreative sex to non-coital sex between same-sex part-
ners. Marriage equality jurisprudence extended those same 
values to same-sex marriage and non-traditional family for-
mation. 
More specifically, marriage equality jurisprudence stands 
not just for the relatively narrow proposition that the Constitu-
 
governmental regulation of procreative conduct, see Abbasi, supra note 85, at 
39; Katheryn D. Katz, Lawrence v. Texas: A Case for Cautious Optimism Re-
garding Procreative Liberty, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 249, 253 (2004). 
 306. 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause protects a right to marital privacy that prohibits 
the government from criminalizing married persons’ use of contraception). 
 307. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from treating single per-
sons and married persons differently with respect to their decisions to use con-
traception). 
 308. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause prohibits the government from infringing on a woman’s right 
to decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy). 
 309. 431 U.S. 494, 498 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the state from passing re-
strictive housing laws that “slic[e] deeply into the [biological] family itself ”). 
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tion protects a fundamental right to marry that includes same-
sex marriage, but also for the broader principle that the Consti-
tution prohibits the state from establishing a particular vision 
of kinship to which its citizens must conform.310 In Kitchen v. 
Herbert,311 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit embraced 
the familial disestablishment principle when it held that exclu-
sionary marriage laws violated an individual’s constitutionally 
guaranteed rights to marry and “establish” the kind of “family” 
she desired.312 In Obergefell, the Supreme Court embraced that 
principle when it recognized the vigorous protection that the 
Fourteenth Amendment extends to “choices concerning . . . fam-
ily relationships.”313 Far from protecting just same-sex mar-
riage, then, the marriage equality precedent safeguards famili-
al choice and association, “cast[ing] serious doubt . . . on specific 
efforts to limit opportunities for same-sex couples to form fami-
lies.”314 That precedent furthers a trend “toward a thinner form 
of establishment, if not disestablishment,” in the law of mar-
riage as well as in the law of the family writ large.315 
Familial disestablishment jurisprudence unsettles the ac-
tual and proposed reproductive regulation considered in Part I, 
including the judicial and legislative refusal to view sex as just 
another form of alternative reproduction. The law declines to 
recognize a category of “artificial insemination by inter-
course,”316 reasoning that the “distinction between reproduction 
 
 310. For the argument that contemporary marriage equality jurisprudence 
stands for an expansive right to familial self-definition, see Cahill, Oedipus 
Hex, supra note 2, at 246–49; Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: 
The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817 (2014); NeJaime, 
supra note 5, at 1231 (arguing that “marriage equality may facilitate, rather 
than disrupt, the new model of parenthood built in earlier nonmarital work”). 
 311. 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 312. Id. at 1199 (holding that “the Fourteenth Amendment protects the 
fundamental right to marry, establish a family, raise children, and enjoy the 
full protection of a state’s marital laws”). 
 313. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). The Court’s deci-
sion in United States v. Windsor paved the way for the constitutional parity 
that Obergefell establishes between same-sex and opposite-sex families with 
regard to familial choice. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 
(2013) (criticizing the Defense of Marriage Act in part because it “makes it 
even more difficult for the children [of same-sex couples] to understand the 
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families 
in their community and in their daily lives” (emphasis added)). 
 314. NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1255. 
 315. Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 
YALE L.J. 1236, 1270 (2010). 
 316. Kesler v. Weniger, 744 A.2d 794, 796 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). 
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via sexual intercourse and the non-sexual clinical options for 
conception” is “commonsense.”317 In so doing, it uses sex as a 
proxy for intimacy, thereby establishing an idealized vision of 
sex. Moreover, it imposes biological fatherhood in situations 
where it is unwanted, thereby establishing an idealized vision 
of biological, dual-gender parenthood.318 
In addition, familial disestablishment jurisprudence upsets 
regulatory regimes that rely on the sex/non-sex binary to estab-
lish the traditional family. Some of those regimes use the 
sex/non-sex binary to entrench the traditional nuclear family 
for overtly ideological reasons. For example, David 
Blankenhorn asserts a distinction between procreation the “old-
fashioned way” and procreation the “intentional” way in order 
to justify alternative reproductive regulation that privileges bi-
ology over other forms of connection and affiliation.319 Others 
use that binary in more subtle ways to channel individuals into 
thinking about the family according to a traditional paradigm 
of it. For example, Cahn invokes the binary to justify the regu-
lation of alternative reproduction—by eliminating sperm donor 
anonymity,320 for instance, and by requiring sperm donors to 
register with a sperm donor registry321—in ways that force 
those who rely on sperm donors to conceptualize them in famil-
ial terms.322 Whether transparently ideological or not, all of 
these regimes are in serious tension with constitutional law’s 
interrelated values of familial autonomy and disestablishment. 
Not only do they frustrate individuals’ efforts “to establish” the 
 
 317. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1245 (Pa. 2007). 
 318. See Polikoff, supra note 126, at 59, 62 (urging the law to move “to-
wards [allowing] . . . all women to raise a child without a legal father,” should 
they so desire, and arguing that forced paternity in cases where women do not 
want it reinforces the message that “children’s families will be incomplete 
without a man”). 
 319. Marquardt, supra note 8, at 23. For a longer discussion of how alter-
native reproduction has become the new resting place for Blankenhorn’s long-
standing anxiety over non-traditional family formation, see Cahill, Oedipus 
Hex, supra note 2, passim. 
 320. For the argument that anonymous gamete donation could lead to acci-
dental incest, see Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line – or the 
Curtain? – for Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59 (2009). 
 321. For the argument that the federal government ought to establish na-
tional gamete donor registries, see Naomi Cahn, Necessary Subjects: The Need 
for a Mandatory National Donor Gamete Databank, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH 
CARE L. 203, 203–06 (2009); Cahn, The New Kinship, supra note 104, at 6. 
 322. For an elaboration of how Cahn’s (and others’) arguments favoring 
greater regulation of alternative reproduction raise familial establishment 
concerns, see Cahill, Oedipus Hex, supra note 2, at 226–37. 
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family that they want, but they also simultaneously reinforce 
and solidify a normative conception of kinship. 
D. PROCREATIVE INTENTIONALITY AND PURPOSEFUL 
PARENTHOOD 
Reproductive binarism privileges the manner of procrea-
tion over the intentions of the procreative parties. As such, it 
frustrates constitutional norms favoring intention as the foun-
dation of parental and familial rights. For more than fifty 
years, constitutional law has recognized the values of private 
ordering and procreative intentionality in shaping rights relat-
ing to privacy, procreation, and the family.323 Recent constitu-
tional decisions on marriage and the family endorse and reaf-
firm those same values. 
In an article on the synergistic relationship between family 
law and marriage equality jurisprudence,324 Douglas NeJaime 
argues that Obergefell vindicates the “intentional parenthood 
principle” that emerged from family law advocacy on behalf of 
intentional—and often non-biological—parents starting in the 
1990s.325 Contesting the view that marriage equality represents 
a dramatic departure from that advocacy,326 NeJaime contends 
that “marriage equality was partly enabled by—and in turn 
enables—intentional and functional concepts of parenthood 
forged in earlier nonmarital [family law] advocacy.”327 Under 
this view, marriage equality reflects, channels, and solidifies 
the model of intentional procreation and parenthood that mate-
 
 323. See Shultz, supra note 200, at 327–28, 327 n.82 (stating that “[o]ur 
society generally favors the fulfillment of individual purposes and the amplifi-
cation of individual choice. . . . Our political and cultural traditions emphasize 
individual liberty, particularly in central arenas of personal life, such as re-
production,” and citing Skinner, Griswold, and Roe in support of that proposi-
tion). 
 324. NeJaime, supra note 5. 
 325. Id. at 1200, 1249. Family law’s emphasis on intention as the basis for 
legal rights, rather than on traditional indicia of legal parenthood like biology, 
gender, and marriage, has been widely observed and amply documented. See, 
e.g., Ian Ayres, Empire or Residue: Competing Visions of the Contractual Can-
on, 26 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 897 (1999); Ertman, supra note 167, at 81–82; Hill, 
supra note 270, at 386 (“[D]efending an ‘intentionalist’ account of the right of 
procreation . . . .”); Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 97, at 429; Jana 
B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443; Richard 
F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the 
Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002). 
 326. See NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1231–36 (summarizing these argu-
ments). 
 327. Id. at 1236. 
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rialized over decades of LGBT family law work.328 Like the body 
of family law that paved its way, marriage equality prioritizes 
function and intent over traditional indicia of parenthood like 
biology, sexual orientation, and even marriage itself. 
By valuing procreative form over procreative intent, repro-
ductive binarism undermines constitutional law’s prioritizing of 
private ordering in procreative and familial affairs. Laws that 
regulate the practices of alternative reproduction, including 
mandatory non-anonymity laws and mandatory donor regis-
tries, frustrate procreative and familial intent by imposing a 
particular image of family—biological paternity—on those who 
might want to define family in less-traditional ways. Judicial 
decisions that void sexual insemination contracts on public pol-
icy grounds do so as well, privileging as they do reproductive 
acts over reproductive intentions. 
V.  REPRODUCTION BY INTENT   
What would the law look like in a world where legal rela-
tionships and reproductive practices did not turn so heavily on 
a factually incoherent and constitutionally questionable 
sex/non-sex binary? The primary objectives of this Article have 
been to illuminate the pervasive presence of that binary in the 
law and to challenge it from a factual/formal and constitutional 
perspective. For that reason, this Part only briefly—and tenta-
tively—answers the question posed above. 
Section A proposes a unitary model of reproductive regula-
tion grounded in intent and argues that that model ought to 
guide the regulation of sexual and alternative reproduction 
alike. The current approach to reproductive regulation centers 
on criteria—like intimacy, sex, deliberation, control, chance, 
artfulness, and naturalness—that are vague, equivocal, and 
misleading; they are also normatively undesirable and consti-
tutionally questionable in light of existing and emerging consti-
tutional norms relating to sex, marriage, procreation, and fami-
ly formation. A new model that better comports with those 
norms is needed, and Section A offers one. Section B antici-
pates and responds to objections to the model put forth in Sec-
tion A. 
 
 328. According to NeJaime, marriage equality has also enabled intentional 
parenthood in some states, like Florida and Iowa, where courts have invoked 
the marriage equality precedent in support of intentional same-sex family 
formation. See id. at 1246–47, 1256–58 (discussing Iowa and Florida, respec-
tively). 
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A. TOWARD AN INTENT-BASED MODEL OF REPRODUCTION 
This Article favors a unitary system of reproductive regula-
tion that turns on intent rather than on procreative mechanics 
and on unreliable (and constitutionally questionable) criteria 
like sex and intimacy. Other scholars support similar treat-
ment of sexual and alternative reproduction, although not for 
all of the reasons and in the ways identified here.329 For some, 
the similarities between sexual and alternative reproduction 
militate in favor of less state intervention in alternative repro-
duction. For others, those similarities support greater, not less-
er, regulation of it. 
For instance, arguing that “like cases” ought to receive 
“like treatment,”330 Marsha Garrison proposes that the law pro-
hibit anonymous sperm donation in cases involving women who 
are not married to someone with whom they intend to raise a 
child that results from that donation. Such women would in-
clude single women and perhaps also lesbian couples, whether 
married or not.331 “[O]utside the [alternative insemination by 
 
 329. See, e.g., ERTMAN, supra note 125, at xiv–xv (discussing similarities 
between “Plan A” and “Plan B” parenthood in terms of procreative intention); 
Appleton, supra note 50, at 111 (asking whether parentage law’s “sex/no sex 
dividing line” warrants reconsideration in light of the “natural insemination” 
movement and of the growing number of non-traditional procreators who seek 
to create family through alternative means); NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1253 
(stating that marriage equality “presents a challenge to family law regulations 
that continue to draw distinctions between families formed by different-sex 
and same-sex couples”); Polikoff, supra note 126, at 59 (supporting the crea-
tion of families through sexual and non-sexual means); Robertson, Procreative 
Liberty, supra note 97, at 428 (favoring parity of treatment between sexual 
and alternative reproduction because of the similar interests involved in each). 
None of these commentators situates, as this Article does, different treatment 
of sexual and alternative reproduction within the larger context of the law’s 
sex/non-sex binary. Nor does any consider why maintaining that binary—in all 
of the ways that the law does—makes little sense as a factual matter and is 
likely unconstitutional in light of existing and emerging constitutional norms 
relating to sex, marriage, procreation, and family formation. 
 330. Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making, supra note 104, at 879. Gar-
rison posits that “[t]he law has never cared whether sperm and ovum met in a 
fallopian tube or in the uterus; there is no obvious reason why it should care if 
sperm and ovum meet in a petri dish. What matters are the relational inter-
ests that ultimately result.” Id. at 880. 
 331. See id. at 896–97 (supporting anonymous donation in cases involving 
married women and their husbands, so long as their husbands consent); id. at 
903 (opposing anonymous donation in cases involving single women). Because 
Garrison wrote her article before same-sex marriage was legally recognized in 
any U.S. jurisdiction, it is hard to say whether she would support anonymous 
donation in cases involving women married to other women, where the “paren-
tal presumption” might apply. On the application of the presumption in that 
  
2016] REPRODUCTION RECONCEIVED 687 
 
donor] context,” she says, “our legal system grants no parent, 
male or female, the right to be a sole parent.”332 “[T]here is no 
obvious reason why paternity laws should mandate different 
results when women conceive using [alternative insemination 
by donor] and when women conceive sexually.”333 
Like Garrison, this Article contends that sexual and alter-
native reproduction are alike in ways that demand “like treat-
ment.” Unlike Garrison, however, it does not favor importing 
the rules that currently govern sexual conception—including 
the universal rules that disallow paternity waivers—into the 
alternative reproductive context in order to achieve that result. 
Moving toward a unitary system of reproductive regulation in 
this way is ill-advised for two reasons. 
First, applying the rules of sexual conception to alternative 
reproduction, thereby not only eliminating sperm donor ano-
nymity but also mandating paternity for sperm donors who do-
nate to unmarried women, will never achieve the parity that 
Garrison imagines. To the contrary, such a regime will signifi-
cantly curtail the reproductive autonomy of alternative procre-
ators in ways, and for reasons, that are normatively undesira-
ble. 
To see why that is so, consider that the law cannot force an 
unmarried woman who conceives with a man sexually to reveal 
that man’s identity; Garrison herself acknowledges as much: 
“[C]ontemporary family law strongly encourages unmarried 
women to establish the paternity of their children, but does not 
mandate it.”334 A not insignificant percentage of unmarried 
women either cannot, or do not want to, identify their child’s 
father, as evidenced by studies on the number of unmarried 
women—a group that accounted for nearly forty-one percent of 
all live births in 2013335—who do not seek child support from 
 
context, see Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Pre-
sumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227 
(2006); NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1240–49. At times Garrison appears to reject 
anonymous donation even for single women who plan to raise a child with an 
unmarried female partner. Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making, supra 
note 104, at 910. At other times, however, Garrison suggests that she would 
support anonymous donation for lesbians, so long as they are married and can 
satisfy family law’s two-parent ideal. See id. at 911 n.340. 
 332. Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making, supra note 104, at 906. 
 333. Id. at 903. 
 334. Id. at 911 (emphasis added). 
 335. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2013, NAT’L VITAL STAT. 
REP., Jan. 15, 2015, at 2 http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_01 
.pdf. 
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the father, even in cases where federal law requires them to do 
so.336 While known paternity might exist in most sexual concep-
tion cases, it does not exist in some of them. 
Mandating legal paternity—and not just non-anonymity—
in the alternative insemination context, therefore, would not 
establish parity between alternative reproduction and sexual 
conception as the latter actually exists. Rather, doing so would 
curtail the reproductive autonomy of alternative procreators in 
order to achieve parity between alternative reproduction and 
sexual conception as the latter should ideally exist, according to 
some.337 
A second reason why Garrison’s recommendation is ill-
advised relates to the law’s shift toward intent-based parent-
 
 336. See, e.g., SHARON HAYS, FLAT BROKE WITH CHILDREN: WOMEN IN THE 
AGE OF WELFARE REFORM 79–82 (2003) (discussing unmarried women’s reluc-
tance or inability to identify their child’s father, even though federal law re-
quires them to do so in order to receive government support); Garrison, Law 
Making for Baby Making, supra note 104, at 911–12. 
 337. See Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?, supra note 14, 
at 32 (arguing that “it seems unfairly burdensome to impose a standard of 
two-biological-parent families for children conceived through [alternative in-
semination] that is not imposed on parents who conceive coitally”). In this 
sense, Garrison’s proposal to require paternity in a large subset of alternative 
reproduction cases represents a normatively and constitutionally problematic 
example of what I have elsewhere termed “regulating at the margins.” See 
Courtney Megan Cahill, Regulating at the Margins: Non-Traditional Kinship 
and the Legal Regulation of Intimate and Family Life, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 43, 43 
(2012). Regulating at the margins occurs, I argue, when the law uses a mar-
ginal kinship practice like same-sex marriage or alternative reproduction as 
an occasion to imagine what the ideal family ought to look like for everyone. 
Id. at 57. The procreation rationale for exclusionary marriage laws was a prob-
lematic—and, according to the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, uncon-
stitutional—example of “regulating at the margins” because it subjected same-
sex couples to a normative ideal, procreative marriage, from which opposite-
sex couples were completely exempt. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606–07 (2015) (rejecting 
the procreation rationale for exclusionary marriage laws). As with same-sex 
marriage prohibitions, laws that require paternity—or simply eliminate gam-
ete donor anonymity—for all donor-conceived persons are a constitutionally 
deficient example of regulating at the margins, as such laws impose a norma-
tive ideal on alternative procreators that cannot be universally imposed on 
sexual procreators. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Universalizing Anonymity 
Anxiety, J.L. & BIOSCIENCES (forthcoming 2016) (discussing proposals to elim-
inate gamete donor anonymity as constitutionally problematic attempts to 
regulate all procreation “at the margins”). Garrison herself recognizes that her 
proposal selectively targets alternative procreators in this manner. See Garri-
son, Law Making for Baby Making, supra note 104, at 912 (observing that “[i]t 
is true that public policy tolerates unmarried women’s failure to establish the 
paternity of sexually conceived children largely because it is powerless to do 
anything about it. [Alternative insemination by donor] offers a context in 
which dual parenting could far more reliably be enforced” (emphasis added)). 
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hood. As Martha Ertman observes in her critique of Garrison’s 
proposal, Garrison appears to favor the conventional nuclear 
family and “majoritarian beliefs”338 rather than private ordering 
and intent as guiding principles for family law.339 Indeed, Gar-
rison’s antidote to reproductive binarism perpetuates many of 
the problems of reproductive binarism discussed earlier, includ-
ing its tendency to undermine the norms and values that have 
emerged from the law’s engagement with the family and its 
radical transformation over the last several decades—norms 
and values like procreative freedom, sexual disestablishment, 
familial disestablishment, familial pluralism, and procrea-
tive/parental intentionality. 
This Article argues that intent, rather than majoritarian 
values or reproductive mechanics, ought to serve as the law’s 
principal guide when operationalizing a unitary system of re-
productive regulation. Even as this Article recognizes that sex-
ual and alternative reproduction are formally similar in ways 
that demand equal treatment, it also argues that intent ought 
ultimately to guide the regulation of all reproduction, regard-
less of the form that it assumes. 
A unitary system of reproductive regulation grounded in 
intent would render many of the proposed regulations of alter-
native reproduction considered earlier legally questionable. If 
alternative procreators are subject to regulations that abolish a 
key industry norm—anonymity—then there is little reason to 
exempt sexual procreators from those same regulations.340 Simi-
larly, a unitary system of reproductive regulation would cast 
doubt on proposals to punish gamete banks for organizing do-
nors in race-salient ways—by, for instance, permitting users of 
those banks’ websites to easily filter (and therefore eliminate) 
prospective donors on the basis of their race.341 “If we scrutinize 
white single mothers’ selection of white sperm donors, we 
should also critique white men who choose to marry white 
women,” Ertman writes. “If this level of meddling seems ridicu-
 
 338. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?, supra note 14, at 
38–39 (including Garrison among commentators who do not “agree that pri-
vate decision-making is appropriate to determine who can become a parent”).  
 339. Id. 
 340. For an elaboration of this argument, see Cahill, Oedipus Hex, supra 
note 2, at 211–12; see also Cohen, supra note 125, at 443. 
 341. See Fox, Racial Classification, supra note 103, at 1852–55 (discussing 
race-conscious donor catalogs). 
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lous, it is hard to see how it is appropriate when the insemina-
tion occurs technologically rather than coitally.”342 
In addition, a unitary system of reproductive regulation 
would require re-evaluating actual regulations of alternative 
reproduction, including FDA regulations that exempt donations 
between “sexually intimate” partners from its mandatory test-
ing requirements. Such regulations rest on criteria, like sex 
and intimacy, which are an unstable and constitutionally ques-
tionable basis for reproductive regulation. If the law exempts 
sexually intimate partners from mandatory testing—as it does, 
whether they are procreating through alternative or sexual 
means—then it ought also to exempt procreative partners who 
are “intimate” in other ways, like Trent Arsenault and the 
women who sought his services. 
Finally, a unitary system of reproductive regulation would 
necessitate a second look at the law’s deeply rooted public poli-
cy against sexual conception agreements and at the continued 
statutory refusal to define sex as a form of assisted reproduc-
tion. If the law permits paternity waivers in the alternative re-
productive context, then it ought to permit them as well in the 
sexual reproductive context, at least where the parties have a 
duly executed contract to that effect. The judicial and legisla-
tive repudiation of a category of “artificial insemination by in-
tercourse” fails to comport with the lived experience of sexual 
and alternative reproduction—as well as with the constitution-
al law that protects both. It fails to reflect the reality that sex-
ual and alternative reproduction are similar in essential ways, 
and that the latter takes place under conditions of intimacy at 
least as often as the former does not. Moreover, it fails to com-
port with the disestablishment and autonomy norms that con-
stitutional law robustly protects. 
B. ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS 
This Section briefly anticipates—and responds to—three 
objections to the regulatory scheme envisioned above: (1) objec-
tions relating to health and safety; (2) objections relating to 
sexual conception contracts; and (3) objections relating to unin-
tended consequences on paternity.  
 
 342. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?, supra note 14, at 
30. 
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1. Objections Relating to Health and Safety 
One objection to moving toward a more unitary system of 
reproductive regulation relates to health and safety: failure to 
regulate alternative reproduction by imposing caps on donation 
and eliminating anonymous donation could lead to health epi-
demics—should a single donor with a deleterious condition pass 
it on to hundreds of progeny—as well as to “accidental incest” 
between unsuspecting donor-conceived children.343 No less con-
cerning are the consequences of expanding the FDA’s definition 
of “sexually intimate” partners to encompass a larger swath of 
procreative partners who do not conform to the government’s 
normative view of sexual intimacy—and who therefore can 
evade the FDA’s mandatory testing requirements for a host of 
transmissible diseases. 
These objections are empirically weak—how likely is it 
that donor-conceived children will “commit” accidental in-
cest?344—but they also fail to reckon with the fact that the risk 
of any of those misfortunes happening is significantly greater 
in the sexual reproductive context than it is in the one which 
regulators are targeting.345 This is not to say that gamete banks 
cannot impose their own caps on donation—some of them 
do346—or prohibit anonymous donation in order to avoid the 
above-mentioned threats should they see a need to. Rather, it is 
simply to point out the problems with the argument that gov-
ernmental regulation of one form of reproduction (alternative) 
is absolutely required in order to avert the same evils to which 
another unregulated form of reproduction (sexual) could also 
lead.  
2. Objections Relating to Sexual Conception Contracts 
A second objection to the unitary system that this Article 
envisions relates to sexual conception contracts and their sup-
posed untrustworthiness and moral unsavoriness. Some might 
argue that public policy militates against legal recognition of 
such contracts, which is the status quo today, for good reason: 
 
 343. See CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP, supra note 104, at 117; Cahn, supra 
note 320, passim. 
 344. See Cahill, Oedipus Hex, supra note 2, at 208. 
 345. See id. at 211–12. 
 346. See, e.g., Cryobank Regulations and Statistics, NW CRYOBANK, https:// 
www.nwcryobank.com/cryobank-regulations-and-statistics (last visited Nov. 3, 
2016) (establishing a limit of twenty-five family units, or “children from the 
same donor living in the same home,” per donor). 
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contractual intent is unreliable when a contract involves sex, 
parents cannot bargain away their children’s support, and con-
tracts whose consideration is sex are morally distasteful and 
invariably void. Each of these objections fails as a persuasive 
argument against legal recognition of sexual conception con-
tracts and paternity waivers. 
a. Contractual Intent Is Unreliable in Sexual Agreements 
The argument that contractual intent is unreliable when 
the contract involves sex assumes that persons who enter into 
sexual conception contracts are “intimates” in an “ongoing rela-
tionship[].”347 Many of the people who participate in the natural 
insemination “movement,” however, might be near (or com-
plete) strangers.348 In addition, the argument that consent can 
never be adequately guaranteed when an agreement involves 
sex reflects the questionable logic of sex exceptionalism. That 
logic contemplates contractual autonomy in most other do-
mains but not in the sexual domain, thereby giving the state, 
rather than the parties themselves, the power “to place [its] 
valuation[] on particular deals.”349 Finally, on a more practical 
level, that argument overlooks the possibility that the state 
could require the parties to a sexual conception agreement to 
follow certain formalities in order to validate it. For instance, 
jurisdictions might require both parties to be represented by 
counsel when entering into sexual conception agreements, as 
many do in the context of prenuptial, surrogacy, and embryo 
agreements.350 “Foremost” among the reasons why the Indiana 
court in In re Paternity of M.F. upheld the donor insemination 
agreement at issue there was the fact that it was “prepared by 
an attorney.”351 Such agreements could also be subject to peri-
odic review, as prenuptial agreements often are. 
b. Parents Cannot Bargain Away the Rights of Their Children 
The argument that sexual conception agreements are void 
because parents cannot bargain away the rights of their chil-
 
 347. Shultz, supra note 200, at 324. 
 348. See supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
 349. Emens, supra note 7, at 356. 
 350. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (stating that if 
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choice, where the intangible costs of any litigation are simply incalculable”). 
 351. In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
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dren, financial or otherwise, confuses two sets of cases: one 
where men attempt to contract out of paternity before sex and 
one where men attempt to contract out of child support obliga-
tions after a child has come into being. Men who enter into sex-
ual conception contracts belong to the first, not the second, cat-
egory, even as courts often casually confuse the boundaries 
between the two.352 Indeed, the whole point of a sexual concep-
tion contract is to allow men to avoid paternity in the first 
place, not to opt out of paternity, already established. 
In addition, the argument that the law ought to prohibit 
sexual conception agreements because they leave a child with 
only one source of financial support is both over-inclusive and 
under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because, in some cases, two 
persons might be the intended parents of a child who is sexual-
ly conceived with a third party. It is under-inclusive because 
the law in many jurisdictions does not prohibit single women 
from conceiving with a donor who waives paternity.353 
Finally, the argument that sexual conception contracts 
wrongfully absolve sexual conceivers of their financial respon-
sibilities assumes that forced fatherhood, whether a man inten-
tionally or accidentally conceives, is a worthy objective. Some 
philosophers and sociologists disagree, questioning whether the 
law ought to impose paternal obligations on men who do not 
want them. They argue that coerced paternity fails to respect 
autonomy by forcing a relationship and its attendant responsi-
bilities on a person who wishes to avoid that status.354 It could 
also lead “to painful ‘disestablishment’ battles that are unlikely 
to be in the best interest of the child”355 and to “violence or 
threats of violence against a mother . . . when child support or-
ders are enforced against” unwilling men.356 Even if we reject 
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the extreme result of these positions—non-paternity for acci-
dental fathers—it is harder to reject non-paternity in the case 
of the man who contracts out of parenthood ex ante. If we wor-
ry about autonomy violations when the law imposes paternity 
on men who become fathers by accident, then we ought to wor-
ry about them significantly more when the law imposes pater-
nity on men who contract out of paternity before sex. 
c. The Law Disfavors Sexual Consideration 
The argument that sexual conception contracts are void be-
cause “sexual intercourse as consideration is itself against pub-
lic policy”357 assumes that sex is the consideration underlying 
the agreement. But consideration for an agreement to exchange 
sperm through sexual coitus in return for a waiver of parental 
rights (and responsibilities) is the sperm (and concomitant 
waiver of paternity), not the sex act that transmits the sperm. 
Indeed, even if sex were part of the consideration, the law gen-
erally permits severing of the sexual aspects of a contract from 
its non-sexual terms. In Marvin v. Marvin, the California Su-
preme Court held that cohabitation contracts were valid in Cal-
ifornia “unless expressly and inseparably based upon an illicit 
consideration of sexual services.”358 In other words, Marvin 
permits “sever[ing] ‘meretricious’ (or sexual) consideration from 
other contract terms,”359 which is possible in the context of sex-
ual conception agreements. Finally, even if severing were not 
possible in the sexual conception setting, one could argue that 
the law’s refusal to recognize sexual consideration in this set-
ting represents yet another problematic example of sex 
exceptionalism and the law’s “distaste for sex.”360  
3. Objections Relating to Unintended Consequences on 
Paternity 
A final objection to a unitary system of reproductive regu-
lation based on intent relates to its unintended consequences 
on paternity. Years ago, conservative commentators worried 
that “no strings attached” sperm donation would have a nega-
tive effect on fatherhood by reducing men to reproductive mate-
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rial and thereby making all fathers seem dispensable.361 Under 
this view, anonymous sperm donation (the marginal case) 
would have the unintended consequence of creating irresponsi-
ble fathers more generally (the general case).362 
One response to this fear is that there is simply no evi-
dence that sperm donation—or alternative reproduction gener-
ally—has devalued parenthood for everyone. In fact, this objec-
tion is reminiscent of one version of the procreation rationale 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Obergefell, namely the argu-
ment that same-sex marriage would devalue marital 
parenthood for heterosexual couples and thereby disincentivize 
them from entering that institution.363 The same-sex marriage 
“parade of horribles” never materialized. Quite the opposite: af-
ter Massachusetts recognized same-sex marriage in 2003,364 
marriage rates increased, not decreased, in that state,365 and 
divorce rates were lowest in states that recognized same-sex 
marriage before Obergefell.366 
In addition, were the law to recognize sexual conception 
agreements, it is unlikely that a sizeable percentage of people 
would opt into them. The Centers for Disease Control estimates 
that less than two percent of all live births in the United States 
in 2013 were attributable to alternative reproductive technolo-
gy, which includes, but is not limited to, alternative insemina-
tion.367 Figures on natural insemination as a form of alternative 
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reproduction do not exist, but the actual numbers are likely to 
be significantly lower than two percent. Less—significantly 
less—than two percent is unlikely to have a sizeable enough 
impact on social norms around parenthood and fatherhood to 
shift those institutions in undesirable ways. 
  CONCLUSION   
The law’s sex/non-sex binary is an equal opportunity regu-
lator, affecting everyone and disciplining many: gays no less 
than straights, singles no less than the partnered, the fertile no 
less than the infertile. It reaches into the most private of do-
mains—procreation and family formation—and governs rela-
tionships that ordinarily receive vigorous constitutional protec-
tion. It is persistent and commands popular support: while no 
longer a valid basis for marriage discrimination against same-
sex couples, reproductive binarism has emerged as a major 
player for both conservatives and progressives in debates over 
whether, why, and to what extent the law ought to regulate the 
practices of alternative reproduction and non-traditional family 
formation. Finally, its scope is vast, if at times invisible, affect-
ing everything from paternity determinations to the regulation 
of gamete banks under federal law. Indeed, few questions are 
more important when approaching an issue of reproductive 
regulation than whether the subject of that regulation does, or 
does not, involve sex in some way—however remote. 
Notwithstanding its power to regulate intimate relation-
ships far and wide, the sustainability of the sex/non-sex binary 
is uncertain. Barely a year into its life, Obergefell v. Hodges has 
prompted scholars to consider the larger implications of a mar-
riage equality precedent on alternative reproduction and on 
family law more generally. Tantalizing in this regard is Doug-
las NeJaime’s suggestion that “marriage equality [may pro-
duce] more pluralistic family law” for all families by 
“accelerat[ing] the slippage between marital and nonmarital 
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parentage” in ways that “yield more robust recognition for some 
unmarried parents.”368 
NeJaime’s “slippage” metaphor invites reflection on wheth-
er marriage equality will also accelerate other kinds of slippag-
es, including the one between sexual and alternative reproduc-
tion foregrounded by this Article. As a factual matter, slippage 
between those two so-called “extremes”369 is already occurring—
and has been for some time now—given the growing similari-
ties between sexual and alternative reproduction. Sexual re-
production is always “assisted,” alternative reproduction is oc-
casionally sexual, and sexual and alternative reproduction are 
sometimes the same thing. The “slippage” that this Article an-
ticipates—and advocates—is therefore not one of fact but ra-
ther one of law: the slippage between sexual and alternative 
reproductive regulation. 
This Article has built a case for why legal slippage between 
those two variables is normatively desirable: the law’s current 
system of reproductive regulation is grounded in criteria, like 
intimacy, that are vague, imprecise, and just as easily applica-
ble to one form of reproduction as to another. It has also argued 
that regulatory slippage is likely inevitable: existing and 
emerging constitutional norms surrounding sex, intimacy, mar-
riage and procreation ought to make it harder for the law to 
maintain a sex/non-sex binary that turns on sex exceptionalism 
and intimacy essentialism. What that slippage will, or could, 
look like in practical terms remains to be seen. This Article has 
offered one possibility, but its primary purpose has been to 
stimulate critical engagement with a binary that no longer 
comports with the lived reality of procreation as it exists for 
many people, or with the law that increasingly protects it. 
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